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The Navy is entering a period of substantial downsizing
due to the reduced global threat. To achieve substantial
savings for the Navy, shipbuilding programs previously
approved by Congress are being reduced or canceled. [Ref . l:p.
3] The result of these cancellations, coupled with the lack
of a commercial shipbuilding market has placed many of the
shipyards capable of ship construction, in financial
trouble. [Ref . 2:p. 2] Some believe shipyards are expected to
go out of business or just assume ship repair work, over the
next few years. If shipbuilding contracting remains purely
competitive, the market forces could dictate where the Navy
will have access to commercial shipyards. Consideration may
not be given to the strategic value of location or type of
shipbuilding capability available.
This thesis characterizes shipyard capabilities,
investigates legislative initiatives, evaluates international
subsidy programs and interprets business conducted at the
United States Shipyards. It investigates whether the Navy
(Naval Sea Systems Command) should let the competitive market
dictate where and which shipyards will survive, and, or should
procurement policy/ legislation be enacted to support a few
strategically located shipyards.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
This thesis will evaluate current and former commercial
shipyard capabilities, identify the anticipated NAVSEA
shipbuilding and overhaul contracts, forecast the
survivability of various regional shipyards and make





The methodology for this research consisted primarily of
a review of Navy shipyard demographics, a review of the Naval
Sea Systems Command's existing and future contracts,
investigation into the proposed commercial work that the
Shipbuilders Council of America provided, analysis of the
projected six year defense plan for ship construction and




Should the Navy let free competition dictate which
shipyards remain in business or should an active decision be
made to maintain industrial shipbuilding capability in
strategic parts of the country?
The following research questions are deemed pertinent to
this effort:
Where are the major shipyards and what unique
capabilities do they possess?
What does the budget include for new construction and
which shipyards are most likely to compete for the new
business?
What is the current and any proposed legislation
concerning competition and protection of the
industrial base?
How is the shipbuilding industry reacting to
downsizing?
What recommendations can be developed to help both
Government and industry in retaining vital
shipbuilding capabilities?
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I has
been an introduction to the thesis. Chapter II provides
background information regarding the reduction of shipbuilding
capability and what factors led the United States shipyards
toward its current problems. Chapter III identifies
contracting legislation and policies regarding retention of
industrial capabilities. The evaluation includes current and
future legislation being proposed to support U.S. shipyards
and the shipbuilding industry. Chapter IV analyzes the impact
of other nations' programs on the U.S. commercial shipbuilding
industry and also the reductions of Navy spending on the U.S.
shipyards. Chapter V identifies various possible solutions
and gives recommendations as to what should be done to
guarantee a strategic capability in the future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. GENERAL
Starting in the mid-1980s, increasing concern was voiced
by Naval Officials and Congressional leaders about the
survivability of U.S. shipyards and their ability to meet
strategic mobilization requirements. Numerous congressional
hearings have focused attention on shipbuilding and ship
repair problems as well as those of the merchant marine 1 .
There have been seven major Government-initiated studies
conducted in the last six years and several non-governmental





As the cold war comes to a close, the nation is looking at
new threats and a new global economic competitiveness. There
is a perception by some Americans, that the United States
Industrial Base is eroding to the point of leading this
country into becoming a service nation. The loss of supremacy
in manufacturing and industrial development could make the
Department of Defense reliant on other nations for support of
the United States National Security
.
[Ref . l:p. 214] Our
capability to build or replace critical hardware or weapon
1. As a general rule, a shipyard could have a shipbuilding
capability, a ship repair capability or both.
systems independent of other nations political agenda, is
fundamental in providing our nation's security. Many
industries, including the shipbuilding industry, have
substantially declined, possibly threatening the
responsiveness of our industrial base. Without countering the
threats, this erosion could rob the Navy and the United States
of industrial capabilities critical to national security. [Ref
.
2:p. 4]
The shipbuilding industry has long been a vital element of
the U.S. defense industrial base and the industry has provided
superior, technically advanced warships for many countries
throughout the world. Shipbuilding is an important element of
this country's overall economic base employing some 300,000
people in shipyards and support industries. [Ref . 3:p. 12]
With substantial downsizing and the reduced global threat,
the Navy is being forced to achieve substantial savings. Many
of the private shipyards are expected to go out of business or
convert to ship repair work over the next three years. [Ref.
3: p. 12] If the Navy and private industry do not react to
changes in the shipbuilding industry, the world market could
dictate where the Navy will have access to commercial
shipyards. Consideration may not be given to the strategic
value of location or type of shipbuilding capability
available, which could threaten this country's response to an
international crisis.
Ronald Reagan, as a presidential candidate, recognized
the importance of maritime capabilities in 1980. His Naval
Maritime Strategy Proposal stated:
Our economic vitality, national defense, and
foreign policy options will depend
increasingly on the use we make of the sea
during the remainder of this century. . .
.
A specific Naval-maritime program must be
developed that will. .. insure that our vital
shipbuilding mobilization base is preserved.
It is essential that sufficient Naval and
commercial shipbuilding be undertaken to
maintain the irreplaceable shipbuilding
mobilization base. Without this nucleus of
trained workers and established production
facilities, we can never hope to meet any
future challenge to our security
.
2 [Ref. 5]
Upon being elected president, Ronald Reagan backed up his
promise of a strong maritime force by pushing through the most
extensive non-wartime military build-up of this century. This
created massive business for shipyards that were struggling
with international competition. [Ref. l:p. 3]
In 1992, we face a new world order never envisioned
possible just four years ago. The focus is not just becoming
the military world power but an economic leader also. Both
are obviously related because as a major world power, we need
to maintain a capability to rapidly deploy and support forces
around the world. To do this, we need a viable industrial
base and capability to surge. Shipyards have been an integral
2 One of seven points in the presidential candidate's naval-
maritime program proposal.
part of the industrial base for many years. The U.S.
commercial shipbuilding market has been eaten away by foreign
competition, and several shipyards have only survived with the
additional work provided by the Naval buildup of the early
eighties. [Ref. 3:p. 8]
As a nation, we are entering a new and challenging phase
in our evolution. Without a great national enemy, we must
focus efforts on competing internationally and economically to
"right size" our industrial shipbuilding base. The difficult
task is trying to decide what should be the right size of this
country's shipyard industrial base, and how to fairly and
economically achieve it.
B. SHIPYARD DECLINE NOT A NEW PROBLEM
Except for the periods during World War I and II, the U.S.




1. Shipbuilding Prior to and During World War II
Laws in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries granted a monopoly to U.S. shipyards with respect to
building merchant ships for the American domestic trade
between U.S. ports. [Ref. l:p. 20] This policy has been
periodically reviewed and renewed in various U.S. statutes and
stands to this day. U.S. Naval construction and repair has
historically been reserved for domestic shipyards.
At the end of World War I, similar to other wars, this
country found shipping routes with excess capacity. The U.S.
shipbuilding program, which continued after the end of the
actual fighting, contributed to the problem. The beginning of
the shipping depression started in 1920 and reached its peak
in 1922 when 75 percent of the Government-owned fleet was
idle.[Ref. l:p. 26] To complicate matters, the 1916
legislation that authorized the building program was also
guite specific with respect to having the Government get out
of the role of shipowner as soon as possible. This however,
was easier said than done, and it was not until almost the
beginning of World War II that the last Government owned ship
was sold. [Ref . l:p. 26]
The excess capacity in world trades brought on hard
times for shipbuilders. With war-built ships selling at rock
bottom prices, there were few orders for new construction. In
1935 merchant ship construction hit a low point. Many old and
established shipyards either went out of business or suspended
operations. [Ref . l:p. 28] Others existed almost entirely on
ship repair work. In addition to these problems, the higher
cost of building ships in the U.S. had become a major factor
in world production. Congressional hearings held in 1920
noted that the cost of building a comparable steel ship in the
United States exceeded that of Great Britain by $60/ton
($70/ton vs. $130/ton) . [Ref. 7:p. 8466]
In 1928, legislation passed that reestablished mail
subsidies on a number of foreign trade routes. This initiated
some new construction and refurbishment of some exiting
tonnage. Also, orders for vessels operating in domestic ocean
trades (trades reserved exclusively for American-flag,
American built ships)
,
provided a safety net for many
shipyards, particularly on the Atlantic coast. Eight years
later, legislation provided for direct subsidy payments to
shipyards building for U.S. flag foreign trade ships. Also
around the same time, President Roosevelt adopted a two-ocean
Naval policy which was important in maintaining a shipbuilding
base during the Great Depression. [Ref. l:p. 26]]
Between the World Wars, building and design
innovations were primarily confined to the transatlantic and
Mediterranean routes. Speed and luxury became major
shipbuilding considerations.
When the United States entered World War II, its most
noteworthy maritime contribution was not in vessel design but
in the ability to mass-produce ships. Some 6,400 merchant-
type ships, including 1,200 small craft, were built between
1937 and 1945. At the end of the war, the Government-
controlled merchant fleet was approximately 5,000 ships. [Ref.
8:p. 68.
]
Equally impressive was the Naval building program for
combatants, which were more technologically complex than
merchant ships. Naval chroniclers Philip Andrews and Leonard
10
Engel summed up the achievement of shipyards:
On 1 July 1940 the Navy had 383 battleships,
carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and
submarines, aggregating 1,313,000 tons.
Including auxiliaries, the fleet numbered
1,076 vessels of 1,875,000 tons. In the next
three years 3 33 combatant vessels aggregating
1,117,054 tons were built. Other completions
in this period were: 1,274 mine and patrol
craft of 199,765 tons, 161 auxiliaries, 654
yard and district craft and 610,781 tons of
landing craft (12,964 vessels) .
Consequently, despite war losses and transfer
of a great many vessels to allied navies, on
1 July 1943 the Navy had upwards of 13,000
vessels of over 4,500,000 tons, including
more than 600 combatant ships of some
2,000,000 tons. Deliveries during June 1943
alone totalled 1,200 vessels, in comparison
with five in June, 1940. [Ref. 9:p. 20]
2. Post World War II
America's maritime supremacy, was short lived after
the end of World War II. High U.S. operating and building
costs had to be offset by direct payments (construction and
operating subsidies) and indirect support such as cargo
reservation and cargo preference legislation. The United
States remained a maritime leader and shipbuilding nation,
only because of massive Government support. [Ref . l:p. 28]
Between 1936 and 1983 construction differential
subsidy payments to shipyards amounted to $3.8 billion. [Ref
.




have been authorized since the Reagan administration
eliminated construction subsidies in the early eighties. [Ref
.
3:p. 7]
The non-subsidized shipowner's (mainly the large oil
companies), declined to purchase U.S. built and flagged
vessels because of high operating and building costs in the
U.S.
Two distinct trends started to develop after 1960.
First, all ships, especially tankers were getting larger. The
larger ships increased efficiency of carrying oil from the
Persian Gulf to the Americas at a time when the Suez Canal was
constantly being closed by Arab and Israeli conflicts.
Second, there was a trend to increase ship specialization for
cargo movement. The general cargo ship that had served for
centuries was being replaced by the containership, roll-
on/roll-off (RO-RO) vessels, lighter aboard ship (LASH)
vessels and the liquid natural gas carrier (LNG) , which was a
design milestone in itself
.
[Ref . l:p. 28] Producing these
technologically complex vessels in American shipyards posed no
problem. In fact, all were U.S. inspired and U.S. developed.
The disadvantages were construction costs (twice as much as
the foreign yards) and delivery time (3 to 18 months longer)
Compounding the cost differential problem was the oil crisis
in the mid-1970s, speculative ordering of ships, and the entry
3 Subsidies paid to ship buyers to bring the price of U.S.
built ships in line with the price of foreign competitors prices.
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of the Far Eastern countries into the shipbuilding
industry
.
[Ref. 3: p. 33] Japan and South Korea became major
U.S. competitors in the early 1980s. These foreign yards were
heavily subsidized by their respective governments. During
the same time period (1981), the U.S. construction
differential subsidies were eliminated, which effectively
collapsed the commercial ship yard market in the U.S.. This
final act made the U.S. shipyards dependent almost entirely on
receiving U.S. Navy construction and repair work. [Ref. 6:p.
12]
3. Shipbuilding Status, From the Early Eighties
The late seventies and early eighties saw a
substantial reduction in commercial shipyard work. Figure 1
shows the downward slope of commercial shipbuilding contracts
and the number of Navy ships under contract or on order per
year. [Ref. 3 :p. 5)
In 1981, approximately 120 U.S. shipyards were
considered capable of completing mobilization requirements for
repair, dry docking and construction. Early in the Reagan
administration, a Joint Navy-Maritime Mobilization Base
Analysis (SYMBA) study was initiated. The results were
published in 1984 and identified 119 shipyards in the United
States that had potential national security value: that is,
had the capability to perform mobilization tasks such as
building, drydocking, and topside repairs. Of the 119
13
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Source; Shipbuilders Council of America
Figure 1 The New Merchant and Naval Vessels Under
Construction or on order at U.S. Private Shipyards
shipyards, nine were Government-owned, while the remaining
110 were private. [Ref. 10:p. 1-4] The SYMBA study concluded
that a shipyard mobilization base should:
Ensure that ships of the Naval fleet can be
maintained in a high degree of material
readiness and are modernized with
appropriate new equipment.
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2. In peacetime, retain sufficient capability to
maintain or increase the size of the Naval
fleet and to build and maintain merchant
ships consistent with the objectives of the
Merchant Marine Act of 193 6, as amended.
3. In time of conflict, be capable of handling
activation, overhaul, repair and battle
damage of Naval and merchant marine ships.
4. Ensure that the shipbuilding base provides
the capability to build combatants and cargo
ship to wartime requirements and to support
the goal of a merchant marine that is
suitable in time of war or national
emergency. [Ref. l:p. 9]
The study didn't try to tackle the "right sizing" of
the country's requirements for shipyards, just the capability
that existed at the time. Of the 119 yards that were
operational, only a few were doing major ship
construction. [Ref . l:p. 10] Figure 2 shows the shipyards that
were actually working and had ship construction contracts in
1981.
The Shipbuilders Council of America (SCA) , an industry
trade association, developed and annualized the trends in the
industrial base identified in Figure 3. The chart diagrams
the trends of the shipyard industrial base in the early
eighties and gives predictions of future effect through 1995.
Figure 4 is an update of Figure 2, which shows the shipyards
actually working on major ship construction contracts. As can
be seen in comparing the two charts, the number of shipyards
with actual work is substantially reduced.
15
Yards With Ship Construction Contracts
January 1981
1. National Steel +





















Source: Shipbuilders Council of America
Figure 2 Yards With Ship Construction Contracts in 1981.
Through most of the 1980s, the world-wide market for
ships suffered from a massive market depression. The response
by most of the world's governments, except the U.S., was to
support commercial shipbuilding with massive subsidies. The
Navy expansion helped ease the pain from the loss of
commercial work, but the Naval work was concentrated in a
16
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Source: Shipbuilders Council of America
Figure 3 The Declining Industrial Base.
small number of shipyards (90 percent of the dollar value of
contracts were concentrated in five shipyards)
.
[Ref. 3:p. 9]
The Reagan administration cut shipyard subsidies in
1981. The construction differential subsidy was eliminated
for U.S. shipowner's engaged in foreign commerce. This along
with a "window" granted by the U.S. Government for ship owners
17
to buy abroad, lost $1.6 billion in business to U.S.
shipbuilders and virtually wiped out the U.S. shipyard
commercial business. [Ref. 3:p. 5-9]
Yards With Ship Construction Contracts
January 1991
1. National Steel +
2. Maromette Marine
3. Peterson Builders
4. Bath Iron Works
5. Robert E Derecktor
6. General Dynamics-EB
7. Newport News Shipbuilding
8. Intermarine, USA








Figure 4 Yards With Construction Contracts in 1991.
By 1991, the backlog of Navy ship orders was on a
downward slide and no new orders were on the horizon. The
world threat was gone and the Navy was reducing inventory from
18
600 ships to 450 or less. This new environment is going to
generate a Naval requirement of about only five new ship
orders a year. The Shipbuilders Council of America believes
that at this level, "with no increase in commercial business,
there will only be one or two major shipyards and one or two
smaller shipyards left by 1998." [Ref. 3:p. 12] They also
think that a total of 300,000 jobs will be lost from U.S.
shipyards and supplier industries between 1980 and 1999. [Ref.
3:p. 12]
C. SUMMARY
The U.S. Government's intentions are to maintain a
shipyard industrial base for the future. Throughout history,
the U.S. shipbuilding industry's success has been cyclical.
The demise of the industry has not occurred overnight. It has
been declining for the last century as requirements and global
conditions changed. [Ref . l:p. 9]
In time of need, the U.S. has proven that it can mobilize
its shipyard assets quickly, and can rapidly expand output as
required. The Shipbuilders Council of America shows a pretty
grim picture for the future for this country's shipyards if
current trends continue and no new work is added. What hasn't
been shown yet, is what can happen in the future with shipyard
legislation and the potential changes in world requirements.
The next chapter reviews some of the past and current
legislation enacted on behalf of shipyards. The analysis
19
shows positive and negative results achieved through
legislation. It identifies key issues currently facing the
shipbuilding industry and addresses some realistic political
issues facing the industry.
20
III. LEGISLATION AFFECTING SHIPYARDS
A. GENERAL
The previous chapter gave a brief explanation and
historical perspective as to the evolution of U.S. shipyards.
This chapter will tie some of the historical information into
the legislation that may have brought about change. Areas
that will be looked at are: mortgage guarantees, cargo
reservation, the tax treatment of a ship operator's
construction reserve fund, and the Shipbuilding Trade Act of
1992.
It will be shown that most of the major legislation
enacted in support of shipyards over the last hundred years
has been tied to support for the Merchant Marine (ship
operators) . The Merchant Marine has always carried a
substantial amount of political clout and the majority of
legislative decisions center around them.
B. DIRECT SHIPBUILDING LEGISLATION
Table 3.1 below, lists the major direct shipbuilding
legislation enacted for this country. For obvious reasons,
only the major legislation is identified and the key areas are
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
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TABLE 3.1. LEGISLATION DIRECTLY IMPACTING SHIPYARDS
Legislation Provision (s)
Acts of 4 July 1789,







Tariff Acts of 1890,
1894
Panama Canal Act of
1912
Shipping Act of 1916
Tariff Act of 1930
a. Discriminatory tonnage duties
levied on non-U. S. -built vessels.
b. Reserved U.S. coast trade to
U.S. -built vessels.
Limited U.S. coastwise trade to
U.S. -flag, U.S. -owned, and U.S.-
built vessels.
Import duties on steel plate and
iron removed for shipbuilders
Removed duties on all shipbuilding
materials used to construct vessels
for U.S. registry. The Simmons-
Underwood Bill of 1913 put all iron
and steel on the free list.
Legislative basis provided for
establishing the Emergency Fleet
Corporation. This Government
corporation would eventually build
over 2,300 ships of all types, of
approximately 14 million dead
weight tons, at a cost of $3
billion.
Imposed a 50 percent ad valorem4
tax on non-emergency foreign
repairs to U.S. flag vessels.
4 Ad Valorem defined: "imposed at a rate percent of the value
as stated in an invoice" or simply a tax on goods. [Ref. Webster's
Dictionary]
22








a. Restated legislation that
prohibits foreign-owned, -built, or
-flag vessels in U.S. domestic
trades. (Earlier prohibition was
suspended on U.S. entry into World
War I.)
b. Section 30 of Act established
policy of federal (preferred)
mortgage guarantees for
construction of vessels in U.S.
shipyards. "A preferred mortgage
shall constitute a lien upon the
mortgaged vessel in the amount of
the outstanding mortgage
indebtedness secured by such
vessel"
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and
Guam trades reserved to American-
built vessels.
a. Title V provided for Government
payments to shipyards to make up
differences between U.S. and
foreign costs in building ships for
U.S. foreign trade.
b. Act mandated that U.S. -flag
ships in foreign trade receiving an
operating differential subsidy be
built in U.S. shipyards.
c. Allowed ship operator to
deposit earnings and revenues from
ship sales into a tax-deferred
construction reserve account until
expended for ship construction. 5
d. Allowed a shipowner credit on
obsolete vessel toward replacement
construction in U.S. shipyards.




TABLE 3.1. LEGISLATION DIRECTLY IMPACTING SHIPYARDS
Legislation Provision (s)
Act of 23 June 1938




Title XI "Federal Ship Mortgage
Insurance" added to Merchant Marine
Act of 1936. Replaced Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920. In 1986 this
title authorized Federal Government
to insure private loans used to
finance construction/
reconstruction of vessels in U.S.
shipyards, including vessels in
domestic trade and offshore
drilling rigs, barges, and tugs. 6
Provided funds to build for the
Government thirty-five 13,400 dwt.
20 knot vessels. This became known
as the "Mariner" program because
each ship's name was followed by
the word "Mariner".
a. Construction differential
subsidy option extended to all
ships operating in U.S. foreign
trade that are "suitable for
national defense purposes in time
of war or national emergency."
b. Section 507 amended to allow
domestic trade ship operator to
trade in old ships for credit on
new construction; established a
construction reserve fund for this
shipping.
6 In 1985 the Title XI program was badly shaken by the defaull
of the Phoenix Corporation of Houston, Texas on two oil-buik-or<
(OBO) carriers. The revolving fund of the Title XI program was
reduced by over $125 million. Total loan defaults through 198!
totaled $675 million. In February 1986, the Maritime
Administration faced the possibility of an additional $220 millioi
default from the Houston-based Global Marine, Inc. The firm filec
for protection under the bankruptcy laws in January 1986.
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TABLE 3.1. LEGISLATION DIRECTLY IMPACTING SHIPYARDS
Legislation Provision (s)
Merchant Marine Act a. Set goal of building 300 ships
of 1970 for U.S. -flag registry over next 10
years. Construction subsidies were
to be primary financing mechanism.
Goal was to reduce CDS to 3 5
percent.
b. Extended construction
assistance to bulk carriers, not
necessarily suitable for national
defense in time of war or national
emergency.
Public Law 97-252, 8 Established that no Naval vessel or
September 1982 major component may be constructed
in a foreign shipyard unless
authorized by the president in the
interest of national security.
Source: Whitehurst , Clinton H
.
, The O.S. Shipbuilding Industry: Past
Present and Future, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MP p. 33-35.
The period from 1865 to World War I, was an era of
generally high American tariffs on foreign imports, and on
steel in particular. At different times, both the Democrats
and Republicans supported lower duties, but as a rule, tariffs
remained high. However, some relief with respect to importing
shipbuilding materials was forthcoming. An Act in 1872
allowed materials used in the construction of wooden vessels
to enter duty-free. After 1912, all materials used in the
construction of ships for U.S. registry were on the free
list.[Ref. l:p. 36]
1. Emergency Fleet Corporation
The Shipping Act of 1916 established the Emergency
25
Fleet Corporation (EFC) , whose primary purpose was to acquire,
through building and other means, sufficient tonnage to meet
America's vital shipping needs. Internal bureaucratic
bickering with respect to contract awards and material
priorities delayed the program for six months, bringing both
administration and congressional criticism. [Ref. l:p. 36]
Vessel output did not reach its peak until a full two years
after its origination. In addition to the delay, the largest
shipyard built from the ground up, the Hog Island Shipyard
near Philadelphia, was not completed until after Armistice.
A key lesson learned for the future was that it is extremely
difficult to build ships in a hurry without prior planning and
facilities, particularly when a shipbuilding base is
unprepared and lacking. [Ref . l:p. 38]
After the war, it was very difficult to dispose of the
mammoth buildup of war ships. Similar to today's environment,
debate centered around how to equitably dispose of war-built
assets. Many in Congress objected to selling, at bargain
prices ships, that cost $200/ton to build. [Ref. l:p. 37] A
major problem was that while many of these ships were not
suitable for the American trade routes, they were quite
suitable for a number of others, particularly Mediterranean
and Baltic Sea routes. The U.S. Shipbuilding Board, which was
an agency charged with disposing of Government-owned ships,
was given discretion to sell the ships "Consistent with good
business practices.
"
[Ref . l:p. 38] The enabling law was the
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Merchant Marine Act of 1920. Section 11 of the legislation
created a construction loan that was to be funded by revenues
from the sale and operation of Government-owned ships. [Ref.
l:p. 40]
2. The Merchant Marine Act of 192
Commonly referred to as the "Jones Act", this
legislation prohibits foreign-owned, foreign-built, or
foreign-flag vessels in U.S. domestic trade routes. Numerous
reguests for waivers or modifications to the Jones Act have
decreased its intended effect of protecting the domestic
shipbuilding and shipping industries. Railroads and trucks
have also cut into the market share otherwise served by
intracoastal shipping. [Ref . 2:p. 17]
3. Tariff Act of 1930
This Act imposed a 50 percent ad valorem tax on non-
emergency repairs to U.S. flag vessels done in a foreign port.
Some U.S. flag shippers find it cost-effective to pay the tax.
Repairs completed offshore in the past years include the
complete reconstruction and modernization of a U.S. flag
vessel, characterized as "emergency repair". The
Congressional Budget Office reported that approximately $10
million in penalties are currently paid annually by U.S. flag
shippers. [Ref . 2:p. 17]
4. MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 19 3 6
The Merchant Marine Act of 193 6, was the most
comprehensive piece of shipping and shipbuilding legislation
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in American history. [Ref. l:p. 42] Title V had the most
direct impact on shipbuilding in that it provided a mechanism
for the Government to pay a shipyard contracting with an
American foreign-trade ship operators, the difference between
the higher American cost of construction and lower foreign
cost of ship construction. In 1935, the differential was
originally established at 33 1/3 percent, excluding the cost
of national defense features, with the provision that the
Maritime Commission could increase the percentage to 50
percent differential if warranted. [Ref . l:p. 42] In 1938, a
blue ribbon commission appointed by the U.S. Maritime
Commission pursuant to the Merchant Marine Act of 193 6 noted
that it was possible that the cost difference might exceed 50
percent. With this in mind the Commission concluded that:
A less expensive remedy would be to permit
construction abroad in all cases in which the
foreign costs are less than half the costs
here, registry here being required as soon as
practicable, and the vessel so built and
registered being eligible for an operating-
differential subsidy as if built here.
Domestic shipping, however, should be
protected from the competition of vessels so
registered to the full extent that is
protected from the competition of vessels
receiving a construction differential
subsidy.
This suggestion the Commission recommends.
It would, where applicable, relieve the
Government from the necessity of providing
cash either as a loan or as a contribution
(except as to national defense features) . It
would prevent the development and maintenance
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of our merchant marine being checked by the
rise of shipbuilding costs here to levels
more than twice as high as those abroad. [Ref.
12:p. 64]
Overall, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 made shipyard
investment an attractive option for private capital. At that
time, the foreign trade fleet was approaching statutory
obsolescence (the Merchant Marine Act of 193 6 reguired
subsidized operators to replace vessels over 20 years old.)
It was estimated that about 90 percent of the merchant fleet
would need replacement by 1942. [Ref. l:p. 37]
In 1938, the Merchant Marine Commission recommended a
50 ship per year building program. After war broke out in
Europe in 1939, it became apparent that the United States
could be involved. In 1941, President Roosevelt announced an
emergency 200 ship per year building program. Prior to Pearl
Harbor, the figure was increased to 300 ships per year. All
this construction was in addition to the large Naval
construction programs that were taking place at the time. It
is important to note that major construction had been
initiated in 1938 and that the shipbuilding base was being put
in place prior to the increased emergency shipbuilding order
from President Roosevelt
.
[Ref . l:p. 38]
Pre-World War II, the Merchant Marine fleet consisted
of general cargo vessels. After the war, needs changed to a
demand for specialized carriers, such as bulk carriers, large
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tankers and other specialized ships. In 1952 and 1970,
legislation was changed to include the construction
differential subsidy option to operators of specialized
vessels. [Ref. 13:p. 124]
C. INDIRECT AID TO SHIPBUILDING
Several indirect shipbuilding support arrangements have
been enacted over the history of our country. Table 3.2
summarizes the major legislative action enacted.
TABLE 3.2 LEGISLATION INDIRECTLY AIDING U.S. SHIPYARDS
Legislation Legislative Provisions
Acts for 1792, a. Federal Government provided a
1813, 1818 bounty for construction of fishing
vessels.
b. Subsidies granted to cod fishing
fleet.
Act of 3 March Mail subsidies provided to selected
1845 shipping firms to encourage an
American flag presence on certain
routes. Ships were to be American-
built. The subsidy was canceled in
1858.
Act of 23 December Foreign vessels wrecked on U.S. coasts
1852 could be admitted to U.S. registry if
repairs (made in United States) were
equal to three times the salvage value
of the vessel. Act amended in 1894 to
allow registry of foreign vessels
wrecked anywhere on same conditions.
Act of 28 May 1865 Mail subsidies reinstated.
Act of 18 July Shipowners who transferred their
1866 vessels to foreign flag during Civil
War could not re-register them under
U.S. flag.
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TABLE 3.2 LEGISLATION INDIRECTLY AIDING U.S. SHIPYARDS
Legislation Legislative Provisions
Ocean Mail Act of
1891














Comprehensive system of subsidized
mail services authorized. Ships on
these routes were to be U.S. -built.
Military cargo reserved to U.S. -flag
ships and
,
by definition, to U.S.-
built vessels.
Section 11 established a construction
loan fund of $25 million. It was to
be used to "aid in the construction of
vessels of the best and most suitable
types for U.S. foreign commerce."
Funds were available to ship operator
on favorable terms.
a. Construction loan fund increased
to $125 million.
b. Mail subsidies made dependent on
replacement (in U.S. shipyards) of
obsolete vessels.
Vessel operator receiving an operating
differential subsidy required to build
ships in the United States.
Surplus war-built ships sold to U.S.
firms on a preferred basis and on
favorable terms. Modification to
peacetime configurations, repairs, and
overhaul of these vessels done in U.S.
yards. (See Tariff Act of 1930 and
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Table
3.1)
Fifty percent of Government-sponsored
cargoes must move in U.S. -flag ships,
if available. The Act induced a
demand for U.S. -built ships.
Shipments under the Agricultural Trade
and Development Act of 1954 were also
included in above described cargo-
sharing arrangement.
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TABLE 3.2 LEGISLATION INDIRECTLY AIDING U.S. SHIPYARDS
Legislation Legislative Provisions





















Government share of construction cost
raised to 55 percent for a two-year
period. Purpose was to encourage
replacement of U.S. -flag tonnage in
U.S. shipyards.
Act of 7 July amended to include
reconstruction of ships at 55 percent
subsidy level.
Prohibited export of domestically
produced crude oil unless the
president certified that such would
not imperil domestic supplies and was
in national interest. Note that
Section 27 of Merchant Marine Act of
1920 (Jones Act) restricts cargo
movement between U.S. ports to U.S.-
flag/built ships.
a. As a matter of national policy
legislation required that "major
combatant vessels for strike forces of
the U.S. Navy be nuclear powered."
Given the secrecy constraint on U.S.
nuclear ship technology, the amendment
effectively limited this work to U.S.
yards.
Restricted the export of Alaska North
Slope oil until 30 September 1983.
Note: Congress granted two year
extension in 1983, i.e., until 1985.
This legislation "deregulated" to a
certain extent American-flag liner
companies. To the extent these
companies were better able to compete
in international ocean shipping, U.S.
shipyards indirectly benefitted.
Extended prohibition against
Department of Defense purchasing any
military vessel, not just Naval
vessels, from a foreign shipyard.
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TABLE 3.2 LEGISLATION INDIRECTLY AIDING U.S. SHIPYARDS
Legislation Legislative Provisions
An Act to Restricted the export of Alaska North
Reauthorize the Slope crude oil. Legislation required
Export a review of the export restriction
Administration Act provisions of the Act along with a
of 1979 (Public review of other Federal and State
Law 99-64, 12 July taxing and leasing policies.
1985)
Source: Whltehurst, Clinton H., The O.S. Shipbuilding Industry: Past
Present and Future, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis . MP p. 39-41.
1. Cargo Reservation
Indirect support consists of various cargo reservation
programs, mainly the 1904 Military Transportation Act, the
1954 Cargo Preference Act, the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954 (Title II) , and to a lesser extent,
Public Resolution Number 17 (March 1934) , which provides that
where Government loans are made to foster exports, the exports
must be carried in U.S. -flag ships. [Ref. l:p. 42] It is known
that there is an increased cost in using U.S. flag vessels but
the increased cost is widely debatable. In a 1978 Report to
Congress, the U.S. GAO cited a study that estimated the cost
to exceed $5 billion over a 20 year period. [Ref. 14:p. 6]
These cargo preference laws generate significant
revenues for U.S. flag ship operators ($619 million in 1982)
and provide indirect support for U.S. shipbuilding
industry. [Ref . 2:p.l8]
2. Merchant Marine Act of 19 3 6
The Federal Ship Financing Guarantee Program (Title
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XI), of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, was noted as being
one of the most successful indirect approaches used to aid
shipyards. The program insured the full payment to a private
lender should the vessel owner be in default.
In 1983, 254 deep-draft vessels were covered to the
extent of $4.7 billion. When other smaller eligible builds
are included (tugs, drilling rigs, etc.) the vessel total
jumps to 6,491 with a commitment of $7.8 billion. 7 [Ref. 2:p.
17]
3. Tax Policies
Investment tax credits are available for shipyards.
These amount to about $150 million a year, according to the
Congressional Budget Office. Additionally, almost $300
million in taxes have been deferred in recent years by
shipbuilders who make deposits into a Capital Construction
Fund, or by operators who deposit capital gains from the sale
of vessels into a Construction Reserve Fund.[Ref. 2:p. 18]
Both funds are destined to be used later to purchase new U.S.
built ships.
4. PUBLIC LAW 97-252
Historically, American Naval vessels have been built
in U.S. shipyards; and since 1967, all new construction has
been done by private yards. Over the years with the variety
7 In 1984 and 1985, a series of defaults depleted the fund,
which to that point had been self-sustaining. No funds have been
available since fiscal year 1987.
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of contracts tried, and severe problems with cost overruns, an
adversarial relationship developed between private yards and
the Navy. [Ref. l:p. 45]
In 1974, in the House of Representatives hearings,
arguments were heard to return some of the Naval work back to
"Public" Naval Shipyards. In 1980, there was even serious
discussion to have the Naval ships built by foreign
shipyards. [Ref. l:p. 42] This last option was removed in
1982, when Congress passed Public Law 97-252, which
established that no Naval vessel or major component may be
constructed in a foreign shipyard unless it is authorized by
the President in the interest of national security
.
[Ref . l:p
42] The law still stands today and has had major impact on
the survival of this country's numerous private shipyards.
D. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
With the long history of legislative action on behalf of
the shipbuilding industry, it would seem that some firm
conclusions could be reached for a correct support scheme.
The problem is that the environment is constantly changing and
new economic competition is continually evolving.
The U.S. Government has the responsibility to ensure that
there is a sufficient shipbuilding base on which to build in
time of war or a national emergency. Hinged on this
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philosophy is the need to protect and maintain the shipyard
industrial base. Table 3.3 addresses some of the proposed
laws drafted to protect the shipyard industrial base.
TABLE 3.3 LEGISLATIVE AND INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS IN
SUPPORT OF U.S. SHIPYARDS 1983-1992
Direct Support of
Shipyards
Maritime Redevelopment a. Establish a Maritime




Loans to be secured by ship
mortgage or other firm
assets. Legislation would
restructure Title XI of the




b. Various proposals made
to increase the share of
Naval repair and alteration
work awarded to private
shipyards. Proposals range
from mandating 40 to 50
percent of this work to
private yards.
c. Investigate the
possibility of having U.S.
shipyards export diesel-
electric submarines to
allied Naval forces. Report
on feasibility of this
option requested by Senate
Armed Services Committee. 8
8 On 23 May 1985 the Department of Defense recommended against
the option on the grounds of "unacceptable loss of ... irreplaceable
submarine technology." Congress concurred with DOD's
recommendations and retracted the recommendation.
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TABLE 3.3 LEGISLATIVE AND INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS IN
SUPPORT OF U.S. SHIPYARDS 1983-1992
Direct Support of
Shipyards
d. Allow American Flag
operators who build two
ships in U.S. yards for
every three ships built in
foreign yards. These
foreign-built ships would be
considered "U. S. -built" with




e. Fund a grant program to
upgrade propulsion machinery
of U.S. -flag vessels in U.S.
yards. Requirement is that
fuel savings be on the order
of 25 percent and that
engine-rooms be automated.
f. Department of Defense to
finance construction in U.S.
shipyards of military useful
vessels. Vessels built in
series would be sold or
chartered to U.S. citizens.
A variant of this proposal
would make funding a
Department of Transportation
responsibility. 9





Numerous suggestions have been made both in and outside of
Government that U.S. shipbuilding costs can be significantly
reduced if a series of at least 10 ships are built in a single
shipyard.
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TABLE 3.3 LEGISLATIVE AND INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS IN
SUPPORT OF U.S. SHIPYARDS 1983-1992
Direct Support of
Shipyards
h. Authorize $300 million
in construction subsidies
for FY 1986, raise
permissible CDS payment to
60 percent, and increase
Federal Ship Mortgage
Guaranty from $12 billion to
$15 billion.
Indirect Support of Shipyards
Competitive Shipping and
Shipbuilding Act
a. Would reguire that
exporters and importers of
dry cargo and liguid bulk
commodities increase use of
U.S. -built, U.S. -flag ships.
Percent of this trade going
to U.S. ships would begin at
5 percent and increase to 20
percent.
b. Extend capital
construction fund (CCF) to
include domestic trade
vessels. CCF now only
allows U.S. foreign-trade
operators to deposit monies
into tax-deferred accounts
for purpose of ultimate
construct ion/ reconstructing
tonnage in U.S. shipyards.
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TABLE 3.3 LEGISLATIVE AND INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS IN
SUPPORT OF U.S. SHIPYARDS 1983-1992
Direct Support of
Shipyards
c. Allow a tax credit,
similar to present 10
percent investment tax
credit, for work performed
in U.S. shipyards when both
labor and management reduce
construction costs; e.g. if
management reduces profits
by 15 percent and labor
reduces labor costs by 15
percent, then a full tax
credit of 15 percent would
be given. Estimated total
savings in U.S. building
costs is 30 percent.
a. Established "a revolving
Mariner type Fund for the
construction and lease of




b. Start-up money for the
fund would come from $852
million of unused Naval
appropriations. While the
Conference Report set aside
the $852 million, it cannot
be spent until further
enabling legislation is
passed by Congress.
Petition to try to make the
U.S. Government take action
to end shipbuilding
subsidies in Japan, South
Korea, Germany and Norway.
It requires shipowners of
subsidized foreign built
vessels to pay a Tariff upon






Council of America file
petition under Sec. 301 of
Amended U.S. Trade Act of
1974
Shipbuilding Trade Reform
Act of 1992, (Gibbons
Bill) Amendment of the
Tariff Act of 1930.
Source: Whitehurst, Clinton H., The U.S. Shipbuilding Industry: Past
Present and Future, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. MP p. 44-46.
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The Shipbuilding Trade Reform Act of 1992 (H.R.2056)
This legislation is designed to counter foreign government
subsidy practices in the future construction and repair of
commercial ships. It does so by making the principles of
existing U.S. unfair trade laws, which deal with subsidized
and dumped imports, available to the shipbuilding industry.
U.S. industries that produce all other means of transportation
such as airplanes, trains, and trucks have coverage under such
law, while the ship-building industry does not.
It grandfathers the existing ships built with subsidies
and will only apply to ships currently being built that the
Department of Commerce identifies as receiving subsidies.
The law would amend the Tariff Act of 1930. It would
reguire that subsidy information regarding vessels be provided
upon entry within customs collection districts. It would also
provide effective trade remedies under the anti-dumping duty
laws against foreign-built ships that are subsidized or
dumped. Considering the above, subsidized shipowners would be
levied a tax upon entry into any U.S. port.[Ref. 15:p. 47]
E. U.S. POLICY DECISIONS
Some of the U.S. Government's policies and practices in
the past have unintentionally reduced the shipbuilding
industry's ability to compete internationally. [Ref . l:p. 57]
Other governments have assisted their shipbuilding industries
through coordination in development, marketing and pricing
40
approaches and have heavily subsidized them to gain market
share. [Ref. 3:p. 21]
The elimination of the U.S. construction differential
subsidy in 1981, by the Reagan administration, was an attempt
to place the U.S. shipyards on a "level playing field" by
eliminating subsidies. This action, coupled with other
countries continuing to heavily subsidize their shipyards,
lead to the virtual collapse of commercial shipbuilding in the
United States. Shipowners went to the cheaper foreign
subsidized yards for new vessels. [Ref . 3:p. 7]
The Shipbuilding Trade Reform Act of 1992 will help try to
bring other countries back to the so-called "level playing
field". Attempts have been made in the past to get all the
major shipbuilding nations involved in an multi-nation
consortium called the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) 10 .
The Shipbuilders Council of America filed a petition in
June 1989, under Section 301 of the Amended U.S. Trade Act of
1974, reguesting U.S. Government action to end shipbuilding
subsidies in Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Norway.
Numerous meetings and discussions have taken place between the
U.S. Government and other members of the OECD since 1989. As
10 OECD is an organization of economically developed
industrialized western nations.
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of September 1992 there has been no formidable progress made
on the subsidy problem. [Ref. 6:p. 39]
F . SUMMARY
This chapter identified key pieces of legislation designed
to affect the shipbuilding and ship repair facilities. Few
firm conclusions can be drawn about how best, through
legislation, to support high-cost U.S. shipyard industry.
However, there are some general notions that would apply.
It is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that
there is a sufficient shipbuilding base on which to build in
time of war or national emergency. This means putting
priority first to preserving the industry, before regulating
to achieve a competitive or efficient industry.
In the early 1980s the Reagan Administration eliminated
Construction Differential Subsidies (CDS) , which was
disastrous to the already hurting U.S. commercial shipbuilding
market. The subsidies were canceled because the
administration wanted the U.S. to take the lead in eliminating
subsidies in the world. The intention may have been good but
no U.S. policy was established to encourage other countries to
eliminate subsidies.
The OECD has been unsuccessful in getting agreement on the
elimination of subsidies throughout the world members. The
"Shipbuilding Trade Act of 1992", if approved, will tax
foreign vessels built with subsidies as they enter U.S. ports.
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This will go a long way in trying to create the "level playing
field" for U.S. shipbuilders to compete for commercial work.
The only possible detriment of enactment of this legislation
may be the elimination of the Jones Act. The Jones Act allows
only U.S. -built U. S. -registered ships to operate between U.S.
ports. It has protected many commercial cruise ship yards and
inter-coastal shipyards from foreign competition.
Legislation not directly affecting the shipbuilding
industry but may have a positive impact is the establishment
of environmental laws involving ships operation in U.S.
waters. One issue that will be addressed in subsequent
chapters is the requirement for double-hull tankers by 1995.
The next chapter will analyze the future shipbuilding
programs of the Navy and draw some deductions on how this will
effect the shipyard and the industrial base.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SHIPYARD SURVIVAL
A. GENERAL
The U.S. policy for a mobilization base for shipyards is
stated in the National Security Decision Directive 47 (NSDD-
47). It was developed on 22 July 1982, and states that the
"United States is to have an emergency mobilization capability
that will insure that Government, at all levels, in
partnership with the private sector and the American people,




DOD • s responsibility is to develop mobilization planning
in order to provide efficient, competitive peacetime
production, have the capability to accelerate output through
surge capability, prepare to indefinitely sustain combat
forces and reduce the dependency on imported goods. [Ref. l:p.
215]
One of the ways DOD evaluates the shipyard industrial base
capabilities is through a survey conducted by the Maritime
Administration (MarAd) . MarAd conducts a survey annually of
the shipbuilding and ship repair industry. The study is done
to fulfill reguirements established in the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936, which requires MarAd to conduct an investigation of
the industrial base. It obtains information from the
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shipbuilding and ship repair industries to be used primarily
in determining if an adeguate mobilization base exists for





The data accumulated by the surveys are input into the
Shipyard Evaluation Analysis System Model (SEAS) , a
guantitative assessment of the Nation's ship construction and
ship repair capability. The capability is periodically
compared with the Department of Defense contingency
reguirements to assess the adeguacy of the shipbuilding
mobilization base, including ship repair and reactivation of
the Maritime Administration reserve fleet and the U.S. Navy
reserve fleet. [Ref. 17:p. 2]
MarAd distributes the surveys each spring to ship repair
and shipbuilding yards around the country (in 1991
approximately 350 surveys were sent) and publishes
consolidated results in January of the next year. MarAd and
the NAVSEA, Industrial Planning Division, evaluate the results
for future maritime reguirements. They provide a data base
that is used to evaluate the feasibility of proposed
shipbuilding programs. Internal determinations are made
regarding which existing shipyards might construct proposed
ships consistent with ship size, and the reguired delivery
date. Reguirements for new facilities are also investigated
with respect to the demands for proposed shipbuilding
programs. NAVSEA and MarAd also use the information generated
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to respond to inquiries from Congress, Department of Defense
(DOD)
,





[Ref . 17:p. 2]
The statistical information used in the following sections
was developed through the use of the 1991 and earlier MarAd
surveys. The surveys were used to develop evaluations of Navy
programs, Naval shipyards and the private shipyard base.
B. PRIVATE SHIPYARDS
There are a total of seventeen privately owned shipyards
considered by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration, as being major shipyards capable of large
ship construction (Ref. Table 4.1).
MarAd considers General Dynamics Corporations ' s Electric
Boat Division a major shipyard, but because it is engaged
exclusively in construction of submarines for the Navy, it is
not included in the list of major yards.
The Maritime Administration and the Navy consider a major
shipbuilding and repair facility as one that is "open and has
the capability to construct, drydock, and conduct topside
repair on vessels with a minimum length of 400 feet, provided
that water depth in the channel to the facility is at least 12




MAJOR SHIPBUILDING FACILITIES IDENTIFIED BY
MAJOR SHIPBUILDING FACILITIES LOCATION
1. Alabama Shipyard, Inc.




Bath Iron Works Corporation
4. BethShip Sparrows Point Yard
5. Fraser Shipyards, Inc.
6. Halter Marine, Inc., Moss Point
Division
7. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.
8. Marinette Marine Corp.
9. Merce Industries, Inc.
10. National Steel and Shipbuilding
Company (NASSCO)
11. Newport News Shipbuilding
12. Peterson Builders Incorporated
13. Portland Ship Repair Yard
14. Tacoma Boatbuilding Company
15. Tampa Shipyards, Inc.
16. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation-
Seattle Division































Source: Office of Ship Construction, Division of Production, Report
on Survey of U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair Facilities 1991, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, December 1991.
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The Navy and the Maritime Administration have also
identified an active shipbuilding base. It is made up of 16
•'privately owned U.S. shipyards which are open and currently
engaged in or seeking contracts for the construction of major
oceangoing or Great Lakes ships 1,000 gross tons and
over."[Ref. 16:p. 41] Table 4.2 below shows the list of
shipyards considered part of the active shipbuilding
industrial base.

















3. Bath Iron Works
Corporation


































































16. Trinity Industries, Beaumont, 95
Inc-Beaumont Yard Texas
Source: Office of Ship Construction, Division of Production,
Report on Survey of U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair Facilities
1991 , U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration, December 1991.
In 1991, the active shipbuilding base employed 73 percent
of the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry's total work
force, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In
addition, 94 percent of the production workers at the 16
shipyards, were employed in the construction or repair of Navy
or Coast Guard ships. [Ref. 17:p. 41]
At the end of 1991, eight of the sixteen shipyards were
engaged in construction and/or conversion of major combatant
and auxiliary ships for the Navy. Table 4.3. shows the number
of ships by class under construction at private yards in the
beginning of 1991. Two of the yards were primarily involved
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with ship construction work provided by the Navy's T-ship
program. Eight of the yards had only repair and overhaul
work, smaller Navy vessel orders, and non-ship construction
work. [Ref . 17:p. 41]
TABLE 4.3. NAVY VESSELS CURRENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT
PRIVATE SHIPYARDS JANUARY 19 91
TYPE OF SHIP TYPE TOTAL
CVN AIRCRAFT CARRIER (NUCLEAR) 3
SSN-688 ATTACK SUBMARINE (NUCLEAR) 15
SSBN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE 6
(NUCLEAR)
SSN-21 ATTACK SUBMARINE (NUCLEAR) 1
DDG-51 GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER 16
CG GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER 7
LHD AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP 4
LSD LANDING SHIP DOCK 4
T-AGOS OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SHIP (SWATH) 4
T-AGS DEEP OCEAN SURVEY SHIP 4
MCM MINE COUNTERMEASURES SHIP 6
MHC COASTAL MINE HUNTER 7




Source: Shipbuilders Council of America, Presentation to the DoD
Economic Conversion Commission
, September 1992.
Employment projections for production workers are shown in
Figure 5 below. These data are generated by overlaying Navy
projected six-year shipbuilding and conversion programs onto
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October 1991
Source: Shipbuilders Council of America
Figure 5 Projected Shipbuilding Industry Workload
An independent study conducted in 1991, by several senior
military and civilian students of the Industrial College of
the Armed Forces National Defense University, analyzed the
effects of the declining shipyard base.[Ref. 2] This study
found that the industry is able to meet current national
security requirements for shipbuilding. The students looked
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at the current Naval requirements, statistics of shipyard
capabilities, toured several facilities and evaluated the
shipyard base with those requirements. Although the
conclusion was positive for fulfilling current and near-term
shipyard requirements, concern was addressed regarding long
term shipyard survival. They stated that:
The shipbuilding industry is in a state rapid
decline and that if left unchecked, the
decline will erode the shipbuilding
industrial base and its support network of
subcontractors and suppliers. [Ref. 2:p. 4]
One of the conclusions they developed was the need for a
cohesive national industrial policy which includes support to





Private shipyards do not have such a bleak future if they
can make changes to their capital investment strategies and
compete in commercial shipbuilding. According to the
Shipbuilders Council of America (SCA) , U.S. shipbuilders must
build 30-50 commercial ships per year to support the present
physical capacity given the current military workload through
1997. [Ref. 3:p. 46] There are optimistic forecasts for the
increased world demand for new commercial shipping in the
later half of the 1990s. This optimism is caused by the need
to replace older ships because of age and condition and also
meet the new U.S. Pollution Act of 1990. The Act mandates
that tankers in U.S. waters must be outfitted with double
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hulls on a phased schedule starting in 1995. [Ref. 3:p. 46] In
addition, several organizations are starting modernization and
improvement programs. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) has also begun a significant vessel
acquisition program. Congress appropriated approximately
$33.2 million in FY 92 to upgrade NOAA's 22-ship fleet. [Ref.
4:p.26]
There is a large number of conversions being proposed for
the Maritime Administration's Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and a
larger force of pre-positioning assets. The Mobility
Requirements Study (MRS) 11 asserts:
There are threats to U.S. interests in the
world that will require fast, effective
fighting forces capable of fulfilling diverse
missions. .. .Our forward presence is
declining, the number of potential crisis
flash-points is increasing and future
coalitions (of allies) could be ad hoc. To
support national interests, deployment
capability must increase through expanded
investment in sealift, pre-positioning, and
transportation infrastructure in the
U.S. [Ref. 18:p. 23]
The MRS urged that DOD acquire through new construction
and conversion "additional sealift capacity equal to 20 large
(380,000 sq. ft. total capacity and 300,000 sq. ft. capacity
for prepositioning configuration) medium-speed (24-knot
DOD study, parts of which are classified, that Congress
asked for to determine the types of ships desirable for sealift
services.
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sustained) RO/RO ships (LMSRs) .
"
[Ref . 4:p. 22-23] The ships
would be provided for rapid deployment of heavy Army divisions
and maintained in high readiness. They also recommended
expanding the RRF by FY 99, from 96 current ships to 142 and
also increasing the readiness of the fleet. [Ref. 18:p. 23]
This program, a fallout from the lessons learned in Operation
Desert Storm, could provide a large pool of conversion work to
both private and public yards.
The SCA identified a large volume of commercial ship
construction needed to keep pace with the aging commercial
fleet. Figure 6 shows the projected tonnage reguirements from
1990 to the year 2000.
The U.S. is approaching the best opportunity to compete in
the commercial shipbuilding market since the elimination of
the Construction Differential Subsidy program in 1981. [Ref.
2: p. 15] New world construction requirements anticipated in
the mid-1990s will give the U.S. an opportunity to become a
viable commercial supplier again. U.S. labor rates are
becoming more competitive also and stand ninth among
shipbuilding nations, behind Germany, Japan the Netherlands,
and others. Korea, which had enjoyed rates one-third those
paid in Northern Europe and the U.S., faces rapid inflation,
while closing the labor gap. [Ref . 2:p. 15]
Worldwide subsidies are declining. Countries that
subsidized heavily in the 1980s have learned that they forced
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construction costs. In Europe, subsidies are down to 14.9
percent from a previous 2 percent. Germany has frozen
subsidies to free up cash needed for unification financing.
Germany's influence in the European Community (EC) is likely
to influence the further lowering of Subsidies in Europe [Ref.
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2:p. 15] Japan moved to financing R&D support and de-
emphasized direct subsidies. [Ref. 3:p. 38]
Although many countries are moving to eliminate subsidy
practices, they remain a very political issue. Recent riots
by the farmers in France concerning grain subsidies are a good
example. The French farmers don't want to eliminate or cut
subsidies because it will impact their income. Similar
problems could occur if shipbuilding subsidies are eliminated
completely in Japan, Korea, Germany and many other countries.
The elimination of foreign subsidy programs and dumping
practices is essential for the U.S. yards to compete in the
world market. The success of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the possible
enforcement of the Shipbuilding Trade Reform Act of 1992,
could go a long way in achieving competitive eguality.
The next section will focus on public vs. private
competition and discuss why the Navy has a shipyard base.
C. PUBLIC NAVAL SHIPYARDS
Originally, eleven Naval shipyards operated in the 1960s.
During the late 1960s and 1970s, three were closed (San
Francisco, New York and Boston shipyards) as a result of base
closures. Currently, eight Navy shipyards exist "to provide
immediate responsive ship repair support to the current
operating combatant fleet, and to be the center from which




[Ref. l:p. 142] Four are strategically located on
the east coast (Philadelphia, PA; Portsmouth, NH; Norfolk, VA;
and Charleston, SC ) , and four on the west coast including
Hawaii (Mare Island, CA; Puget Sound, WA; and Long Beach, CA;
and Pearl Harbor, HI)
.
[Ref . l:p. 143] The Philadelphia
shipyard has been nominated for closure by the Base Closure
Commission, but it is unsure when it will close since
political fighting continues to keep it open. [Ref. l:p. 221]
Naval shipyards work with the Naval base organization in
getting the reguired security, administrative support and
training required in operating a shipyard. They are part of
the operational Navy in that they provide emergent support to
commands afloat. Very experienced "tiger teams" 12
,
from the
shipyards, have been flown around the world to meet the Navy's
emergency repair requirements. They receive the majority of
combatant ship overhaul and repair work because of unique
capabilities for fleet support. [Ref . l:p. 204] The Navy
shipyards official mission statement is:
To provide logistic support for assigned
ships and service craft; to perform
authorized work in connection with
construction, conversion, overhaul, repair,
alteration, drydocking, and outfitting of
ships and craft, as assigned; to perform
manufacturing, research, development, and
test work as assigned; and to provide
services and material to other activities and
units as directed by competent
authority. [Ref . l:p. 75]
12 Experienced and specialized workers put together to provide
mobile worldwide ship repair and maintenance assistance.
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At the conclusion of World War II, certain functions and
facilities that were formerly the responsibility of the Naval
yards were reorganized and disbursed to Naval Supply Centers,
Naval Ammunition Depots, etc. These changes in organization
and functions made the Naval shipyard's role more questionable
to those who saw the private sector as better able to fulfill
the construction, conversion, and repair work that had been
done in the Naval shipyards. [Ref . l:p. 77]
The Navy shipyards are unique and are responsive to the
fleet needs. Their capability has taken decades to build.
Market trends and flow of mission have not wavered from the
ultimate goal of supporting the Fleet. The economic forces of
the shipbuilding industry drive the type and level of work the
commercial sector is willing to tackle. The Navy Shipyards do
not have that luxury because of the need to maintain certain
fleet capabilities. A good example of market shifts on the
commercial side is the capabilities of nuclear repair and
refueling.
There are currently two private yards that are capable of
refueling, overhaul and repair of nuclear-powered ships.
Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company and Electric
Boat Division of General Dynamics are the only two yards
authorized to work on nuclear ships. [Ref . l:p. 83] The
Electric Boat Division has not done overhaul or refueling work
since the mid-1970s, because it has been totally consumed with
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contracted new construction. Similarly, Ingalls built and
overhauled nuclear submarines at one time, but is now totally
committed to conventionally powered ships. Only Newport News
has retained the capability to accomplish nuclear work in both
construction and repair. [Ref. l:p. 83]
Currently, six Navy shipyards are capable of overhaul,
repair, conversion and refueling of nuclear ships. [Ref . l:p.
83] This capability has taken years to develop, and was not
been developed by the economic forces that drove private
industry. It was done based on the national security
requirement to maintain the unique repair capability. While
it might be nice to have free and open competition between
public and private shipyards, the country can not afford to
lose its capabilities to market trends or political
climates. [Ref . l:p. 220]
It is widely debated in a downsizing environment, why it
is necessary to maintain the eight Naval shipyards when the
Navy is getting smaller and the global threat is substantially
reduced. The challenge of the Naval shipyards as a group,
must be to establish a justifiable reputation for leadership
in productivity, quality and cost.
As the industrial base gets smaller, the allocation of
conversion, alteration, and repair work between public and
private shipyards will be intensely challenged by
Congressional committees and industry trade organizations like
the Shipbuilders Council of America. The split for
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private/public work is usually around 30 percent for private
yards and 70 percent going to public Navy shipyards. [Ref . l:p.
83] No significant change in the mix has occurred in the last
twelve years. As the amount of new construction backlog is
reduced at private yards, more of the large private shipyards
will be fighting for the work that has historically been Navy
shipyard work.
Public Navy yards hold the capability and capacity to do
work on a number of complex combatants in the fleet which some
of the regional private yards are incapable of doing due to
lack of technical capability. The complexity of modern Naval
combatants reguires that a ready base of technologically
trained and experienced shipyard personnel be maintained for
the existing fleet. As strategic and economic events change
in the world, the size of that workforce needs to be
determined in order to achieve the best and most efficient
ship overhaul or conversion program. Public/private
competition will play a major role in determining what the
industrial base will look like in the next decade.
The next section will discuss the Navy's plan for the
future and how it will impact mobilization planning.
D. U.S. NAVY SHIPBUILDING PLAN
During the 1980s, commercial shipbuilding competitiveness
eroded with the elimination or the Construction Differential
Subsidy. [Ref . 3:p. 7] As mentioned in Chapter III, U.S.
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shipbuilders were priced excessively high when compared to
foreign subsidized competition. Foreign yards were
underbidding, and in some cases dumping ships on the U.S.
market in order to gain market share. Due to these practices,
U.S. commercial merchant vessel work seriously deteriorated
and the Navy evolved as the primary customer for the major
shipyard industrial base.[Ref. 3:p. 20]
The Navy's growth sustained some of the shipyard
industrial base throughout the eighties but the nineties are
challenging the endurance and adaptability of that base.
Some procurement officials at NAVSEA believe that the
industrial base was weakened over the years by the enactment
of the Competition in Contracting Act and by splitting awards
between several shipyards. It is thought that the U.S. has
maintained too many shipyards by spreading out the work. The
situation may have developed where the U.S. has several
financially weak shipyards, instead of a few very healthy and
strong shipyards.
Based on interviews conducted with procurement officials
at NAVSEA, the Navy currently has excess shipyard capability
for the requirements planned over the next six years. The
need to have an adequate industrial base for the Navy is still
a major priority and the requirement in the short-term should
not be the only consideration when evaluating national
shipbuilding requirements. The capabilities and the number of
shipyards willing to compete for Navy business will continue
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to change as the threat and the economic environment changes.
The U.S. Navy shipbuilding plan for fiscal years 1992 -
1997 includes the construction of 95 new ships, as illustrated
in Table 4.4. More than $50 billion is proposed for this
plan. Only about a third of this amount goes to the actual
ship procurement. The remainder is attributed to such items
as Government-furnished eguipment placed aboard the ships and
other logistics program costs. [Ref. 17:p. 54]
The shipbuilding program represents a significant
reduction in the amount of new shipbuilding work available to
the nation's industrial base when compared with previous Navy
programs. At an average of less than 12 ships per year, this
program represents almost a 3 6 percent reduction in the
quantity of ships to be procured, compared with the 19 ships
per year average for Navy programs during the 1980s. [Ref.
18:p. 27]
A bright side to the shipyard mobilization base has been
the ship construction and conversion activity for the Navy's
T-ship program. T-ships are auxiliary vessels funded by the
Navy budget but designed to be civilian-manned and under the
control of the Military Sealift Command. Since 1979, 16 U.S.
private shipyards have been awarded contracts for the
construction of 60 new ships and the conversion of 31 existing
ships. The initial contract value for these vessels totaled
almost $5.4 billion. [Ref . 18:p. 27-28]
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TABLE 4.4. NAVY PLANNED SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS FISCAL
YEARS 1991-1997
TYPE OF FY FY FY FY FY FY FY TOTAL
SHIP £1 92 93 94 95 96 97
CVN 1 1
SSBN 1 1
SSN-21 1 1 2
DDG-51 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 28
LHD 1 1
LSD-49 1 1
LX 1 1 2
MHC 2 3 2 1 8
MHC(V) OR 1 2 3
MCM
T-AGOS 1 1 2 1 5
T-AGS 1 2 2 5
AR 1 1
AOE 1 1




23 37 6 7 9 5 8TOTAL 95
Source: Alden, John, "Getting it Right in the New Strategic
Situation", Marine Loq, Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corp.
,
June s 1992.
As of January 1, 1992, 17 new ships were either under
construction or on order at four shipyards. The value of this
order is approximately $1.3 billion. [Ref. 18:p. 17]
The Navy is currently wrestling with constant change from
Congress and the Department of Defense. Any program is only
firm until the next budget cycle. The DOD cancellation of the
"SEAWOLF" program earlier in 1992 was overturned by the House
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and Senate by appropriating money to build two submarines.
This gave needed work to the General Dynamics Electric Boat
Division. Last year the Navy planned to be reduced to 450
combat-capable ships (some manned by reservists) by 1995; this
year the target has shifted to 414 ships by 1997. [Ref. 18:p.
18] With this amount of political instability and the fact
that the legislative process of authorizing ships and
appropriating funds remains long and complex, it is unlikely
the short term shipbuilding requirements will change from what
is shown in Table 4.4. The most likely scenario would be to
move planned shipbuilding programs further into the out years
as funds are reprogrammed or cancelled.
As of January 1992, several Mobilization Base shipyards
were involved with major Navy ship construction. Table 4.5
identifies the delivery dates, ships numbers and shipyards for
current Navy construction contracts. Five shipyards standout
as possessing the majority of future work: Avondale
Industries, Bath Iron Works, General Dynamics EB, Ingalls
Shipbuilding and Newport News Shipbuilding. Much of the
future Navy construction is being awarded to the east coast
shipyards. [Ref Table 4.5]
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TABLE 4.5. NEW NAVAL VESSEL CONSTRUCTION


















































































































































TABLE 4.5. NEW NAVAL VESSEL CONSTRUCTION




Ingalls Shipbuilding, CG-68 87 4/92
Inc., Pascagoula, CG-69 88 9/92















Intermarine USA, MHC-51 86 9/92
Savannah, Georgia MHC-52 89 2/93
MHC-55 90 2/94
McDermott Shipyards, T-AGOS-20 89 4/92
Morgan City, Louisiana T-AGOS-21 89 10/92
T-AGOS-22 89 4/93
National Steel and AOE-6 87 4/92
Shipbuilding Company, AOE-7 89 11/93
San Diego, California AOE-8 90 6/94
Newport News SSN-759 85 1/92
Shipbuilding, Newport SSN-764 87 7/92











TABLE 4.5. NEW NAVAL VESSEL CONSTRUCTION




Peterson Builders, MCM-9 85 8/92
Inc., Sturgeon Bay, MCM-10 86 10/92




Trinity Industries, T-AGS-52 87 1/92
New Orleans, Louisiana T-AGS-60 90 1/94
T-AGS-61 90 7/94
Source: Shipbuilders Council of America, Naval Shipbuilding, January
1992.
Currently, the only major west coast shipyard considered
part of the active U.S. Shipbuilding Base involved with Navy
work is National Steel & Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) . They
are currently building three Fast Combat Stores Ships (AOEs,
USS SUPPLY class) . The west coast shipbuilding costs are
approximately 4.5 percent higher than the east coast yards,
and 9.2 percent higher than the gulf coast shipyards. Wage
rates alone are 18.7 percent higher than the east coast. [Ref.
l:p. 216]
How successfully National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
can compete for Navy and commercial work in the future will
determine whether they stay a viable shipbuilding base asset.
Also, there may not be a need to maintain a major construction
shipyard on the west coast with the reduced maritime threat
and the thrifty economic climate. In 1984, the Supervisor of
Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair sent a letter to major
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shipyards on the west coast stating that unless shipyards got
wage costs more in line with eastern competitors, they could
not expect to get any more work. [Ref 19] This highlights the
problem that western shipyards have when competing for ship
construction contracts. Price will continue to be an
important factor when evaluating for contract award and the
east coast yards seem to have the competitive advantage.
As previously shown the U.S. shipyards have an advantage
over foreign competitors in building very sophisticated
technically advanced ships. This could result in needed
business if the yards were to successfully attack the
technically complex commercial market. This includes Liguid
Natural Gas (LNG) carriers, sophisticated offshore drilling
rigs, large barge vessels and double hull tankers. The U.S.
Navy construction work is drying up, but keeping the
shipbuilding industrial base open and working guarantees
future availability for the country if the need were to arise.
E. SUMMARY
The Naval shipbuilding base will get smaller and the
market forces will keep the financially strong and economical
shipyards open. Shipyards with large parent companies having
"deep pockets" like Newport News Shipbuilding (Tenneco)
,
Ingalls Shipbuilding (Litton) , General Dynamic Electric Boat
Division and possibly NASSCO (Morrison-Knudsen) , are expected
to survive in the future. As the Navy downsizes and the
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backlog of ship construction shrinks, the shipyards identified
by MarAd as the mobilization base, may be hard pressed to find
additional work. Many of the yards will convert to other
forms of construction, such as, smaller ship classes, double
hull tankers, small patrol boats, barges, conversion, repair
work and even some cross-industry manufacturing. Some of the
smaller yards are entering the steel underwater tunnel
construction to keep their workforce going. [Ref. 18: p. 19]
There is hope that the U.S. will resume global
competitiveness within the shipbuilding market in the 1990s.
The need for replacement tonnage throughout the world, coupled
with the emerging requirements by the Merchant Marine have the
potential to keep the U.S. shipbuilding industry healthy. [Ref.
4 :p. 32] Increased competition between public and private
shipyards is anticipated as new construction dwindles for most
of the major construction yards. World labor rates are
leveling and subsidy programs are being reduced among
shipbuilding nations. Greater U.S. interest is being paid to
a legislative recourse in trying to eliminate subsidies.
Chapter five addresses conclusions and recommendations
determined as a result of research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
The shipyard mobilization base is essential to the
national security of the United States. Various legislative
and policy changes have tried to bolster the industry with
varied success. An underlying fact is that a large portion of
a shipyard's value is placed upon its geographic location.
Protecting its value mandates that the U.S. possess a shipyard
mobilization base of some specified size. The correct size is
a constantly moving target, especially in the 1990s as the
world threat continues to evolve.
The shipbuilding industry stands at a crossroads in the
1990s. The majority of U.S. shipyard work is currently coming
from the U.S. Navy construction, overhaul and repair programs.
With the imminent completion of the Navy build-up begun in the
1980s, coupled with its current downsizing, and the lack of
commercial shipbuilding programs, the major shipyard
construction capability in the U.S. will continue to erode.
On the other hand, the industry has the capability to
compete on a commercial basis if subsidies are eliminated by
foreign governments and the industry is able to shift
facilities and capital investments to adapt to the smaller
reguirements in the future.
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B. CONCLUSIONS
1. The shipbuilding base is adequate to meet the U.S.
Navy needs.
The existing shipbuilding base and repair base is
adequate to satisfy the initial activation and repair demands
of the Navy in the near future. Based on interviews conducted
with NAVSEA personnel, the shipyard mobilization base has
excess shipyard capacity based on current and foreseeable
requirements of Navy shipbuilding programs.
With the reduction of Navy work, the industrial base
will be substantially reduced in the future and shipyards with
rich parent companies that currently have the majority of Navy
construction work, are most likely to continue major
construction work. MarAd continues to track shipyard
capabilities annually, and as of 1991, they have determined
that the shipyard base is adequate to meet national
requirements.
2. U.S. defense expenditures will no longer provide
sufficient work to maintain the current U.S.
shipbuilding capacity.
Interviews conducted and statistics gathered from the
Shipbuilders Council of America, NAVSEA procurement personnel,
and MarAd employees have found that the current industrial
base (as identified by MarAd 1991 study) has excess capacity.
The projected Navy construction program alone will be unable
to support all the shipyards included as the 1991 industrial
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base (Table 4.2) . The shipyards expected to be strong players
in future Navy construction work are: Newport New
Shipbuilding, because they can build nuclear aircraft carriers
and nuclear submarines along with many combatants; Ingalls
Shipbuilding, with their capability to build amphibious ships
and combatants; Avondale Industries, for the construction of
the T-ship program, mine sweepers and amphibious ships;
General Dynamics Electric Boat Division, because of their
nuclear submarine construction capability with the SEAWOLF
program (although their survival can be debated because the
Navy may not need two submarine builders in the future and
Newport News has much more capabilities than Electric Boat)
;
and finally Tampa Shipyards, that builds T-ships and small
craft. Bath Iron Works is considered one of the better run
shipyards, but has assumed a lot of debt with the many buy-
outs and mergers over the years (see Appendix A) . Their
future is questionable, but they have survived through hard
times for many years.
3. World ship construction is expected to accelerate in
the mid 1990s.
DOD has budgeted about $3 billion for new sealift
vessels and the NOAA has begun a significant vessel
acquisition program.
The world merchant fleet is aging and the tonnage
requirements show that the world shipbuilding industry will be
busy in providing replacement ships. New ship construction is
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also being generated by requirements of the U.S. Pollution Act
of 1990, which calls for double hull tankers for operating in
U.S. waters by 1995. If the U.S. shipbuilding industry can
become efficient producers, and if world subsidies are
eliminated, than many of the U.S. yards could stay busy with
commercial work until at least the year 2000. [Ref. 3:p. 43-44]
4. There will be increased competition between public and
private shipyards for work throughout the 19 9 0s.
As the industrial base gets smaller, the allocation of
conversion, alteration, and repair work between public and
private shipyards will be intensely challenged by
Congressional committees and industry trade organizations. As
the Navy construction backlog shrinks, the competition will
increase between public and private shipyards as the larger
construction yards (Table 4.2) challenge for additional
business.
5. The U.S. has a great opportunity to compete in the
international shipbuilding market.
The U.S. is approaching the best opportunity to
compete in the commercial shipbuilding market since the
elimination of the Construction Differential Subsidies in
1981. There is a surge in new construction forecasted to
start in the mid-1990s and continue until the end of the
decade. Germany and Japan are reducing subsidies and the
Gibbons Bill is in process, which at the very least should
bring some heightened interest in eliminating subsidies
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altogether. U.S. labor rates are becoming more competitive in
the world shipbuilding market. Currently the U.S. ranks ninth
among shipbuilding nations in labor rates.
6. U.S. Shipbuilding Mobilization Base (Table 4.2) has
specialized capabilities that should be marketed to
specific areas of the shipbuilding industry.
The construction of technically complex ships like
liquid natural gas carriers, chemical carriers, complex
drilling platforms and high-tech small patrol craft utilize
similar skills used in combatant and auxiliary constructions.
It is unlikely that the U.S. could compete in the construction
of large, simple ships, such as large crude oil tankers and
the larger container carriers. Low wages and previous heavy
investment in labor productivity improvements still provide a
significant advantage to countries concentrating on those type
of ships. The future of the U.S. market lies in specialized,
technically complex ships.
C . RECOMMENDAT IONS
1. The U.S. needs to develop a national industrial
policy.
The U.S. needs to develop a cohesive national
industrial support policy addressing the current and future
shipyard requirements. No plan exists and there is no
provision to ensure the U.S. has a domestic source for
military vessel construction. Competition is increasing
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between public and private yards for conversion and overhaul
programs. The result of this competition may be beneficial or
detrimental based on the requirements for future shipbuilding
capabilities. Failure to establish a comprehensive policy
soon could leave the Government no choice but to reinstate
very expensive subsidy programs to keep the required
industrial base operating.
2. Stronger legislation should be enacted to eliminate
world subsidy practices to give the U.S. shipbuilders
a "level playing field" in which to operate.
The Shipbuilding Trade Reform Act of 1992 was an
attempt to tax foreign-built subsidized ships as they enter
U.S. ports in an effort to force foreign shipbuilders to
eliminate subsidies. The OECD has been negotiating for years
to get an agreement on subsidies. If the OECD could be
successful in achieving an international agreement, U.S.
shipbuilders would be more willing to repeal the Jones Act and
other U.S. support programs. The premature U.S. repeal of
construction differential subsidies and the continuance of
foreign subsidies, eliminated the U.S. commercial shipbuilding
market starting in 1981. If world subsidies are not
eliminated, or the U.S. does not establish a policy to
penalize countries that have subsidy programs, the U.S.
shipbuilding industry will not be competitive for the new work
anticipated for the mid-1990s.
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3. A Government program designed to stimulate the entry
of U.S. shipbuilding into the international commercial
market to enhance their competitiveness is needed.
With the current U.S. debt, there is little chance the
Government will create subsidies or major financial incentives
for the shipbuilding industry. With the future global
requirements for double-hull tankers and the need for
sophisticated chemical carriers and liquid natural gas ships,
the U.S. may be able to field support for these ships by
marketing the shipbuilding industry. Incorporating certain
construction and support arrangements for the U.S. -built ships
could help keep the U.S. industrial base intact and the
industry healthy.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Should the Navy let free competition dictate which
shipyards remain in business or should an active
decision be made to maintain industrial shipbuilding
capability in strategic parts of the country?
With the reduced global threat and the need to lower
the national debt, the shipyard industry will have to survive
on the amount of business they are able to gain from the
commercial market. The shipyard base is expected to erode but
not to alarming levels. The health and size of the industry
is currently being tracked by MarAd, and at this point there
is no major cause for alarm. The amount of commercial work
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forecasted in the mid-1990s is considerable. The U.S. should
be able to maintain a large portion of its industrial base
with some legislative assistance in eliminating world
subsidies and increased competition between public and private
yards.
There has been a concern that NASSCO is the only major
construction shipyard on the west coast currently bidding on
major construction contracts. Some industry representatives
are concerned about this. This thesis found that the west
coast ship yards are much more expensive to operate than those
in the gulf and in the south east. With the reduced global
threat and the lack of a major blue-water threat, it is
unlikely that the loss of the only west coast shipyard would
be strategically detrimental to the U.S. A number of
shipyards currently working ship overhaul and conversion on
the west coast still have the capability to build ships if
they so choose. The loss of NASSCO may eventually prove to be
more economical by permitting the future awards to cheaper
south east shipyards.
2. Where are the major shipyards and what unique
capabilities do they possess?
The major shipyards are those that are identified in
the Maritime Administrations list of mobilization assets in
Table 4 . 2 in Chapter IV. The list includes 16 privately owned
U.S. shipyards which are "open and currently engaged in or
seeking contracts for the construction of major oceangoing or
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Great Lakes ships 1,000 gross tons or over." [Ref. 16:p. 41]
The eight Naval shipyards are not directly considered part of
the mobilization base but are taken into consideration when
evaluating the adeguacy of U.S. shipbuilding and overhaul
capabilities.
MarAd and NAVSEA review the mobilization base to
determine its adeguacy in meeting the future reguirements for
the Maritime Administration's RRF and proposed Naval programs.
3. What does the budget include for new construction and
overhauls and which shipyards are most likely to
compete?
The current budget includes construction of 95 Naval
vessels between Fiscal Years 1992-1997. As the budget process
continues and the new presidential agenda is evaluated, the
Navy construction programs are certain to change. Currently,
there are just a few shipyards that will be involved with Navy
construction over the next six years.
Newport News Shipbuilding is one of the most enduring
shipyards because they have the capability to build nuclear
aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, combatants and many
other types of ships. Ingalls Shipbuilding is building
amphibious ships, combatants and has an advantage in low labor
rates. Avondale Industries is building mine sweepers,
amphibious ships and has contracts for a few ships from the T-
ship program. General Dynamics Electric Boat Division has
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some additional work because of the reinstatement of the
SEAWOLF program. Their long term future is jeopardized,
however, by the possible U.S. inability to provide sufficient
business to support two nuclear construction shipyards
(Newport News and Electric Boat). Smaller shipyards, such as
Tampa Shipyards, will be viable for construction of T-ship
programs and small patrol craft for the Coast Guard and Navy.
Bath Iron Works is considered one of the better run shipyards
but they are not financially secure due to the buy-outs and
mergers over the years (see Appendix A) . Any major setback in
construction could adversely affect their continued success.
4. What is the current and any proposed legislation
concerning competition and protection of the
industrial base?
There has been a large amount of legislation enacted
on behalf of the shipbuilding industry over the years (Chapter
III) . Repealing the Construction Differential Subsidies in
1981 virtually eliminated the U.S. commercial shipbuilding
market (see Figure 1)
.
The Jones Act continues to protect U.S. shipyards by
restricting foreign shipbuilders from providing ships for
operation between U.S. ports for commerce and transportation.
The proposed legislation included in the Gibbons Bill,
is an effort to force the elimination of foreign subsidized
ships from U.S. business. Additional legislation and
cooperation with the OECD is needed to force the elimination
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of world subsidies. Resolving the subsidy issue is probably
the single most important thing that Congress and the
shipbuilding industry could do in guaranteeing continued
mobilization base survival through the revival of the U.S.
commercial shipbuilding market.
5. How is the shipbuilding industry reacting to
downsizing.
The shipbuilding industry is in the process of
reorganizing their emphasis from defense related business to
commercial work. The mid-1990s had the potential for the U.S.
shipyards to gain back some of the market share they lost to
foreign competition. Foreign labor rates are rising when
compared to the U.S. thus narrowing the gap. The subsidy
issue is getting increased attention and resolution of the
problem should be forthcoming.
The only way to reconstitute a commercial shipbuilding
base that will also support any Naval maritime requirements,
is for the U.S. shipyards to become competitive in the world
market. U.S. shipbuilders must build 30-50 commercial ships
per year to support present physical capacity, given the
projected Naval workload through 1997. It is paramount that
the U.S. shipbuilders become more efficient and competitive to
achieve this goal.
Many of the shipyards identified by MarAd in the 1991
mobilization base will reorganize into commercial work or
switch to other forms of shipbuilding like conversion and
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overhaul. The increase in resources at NOAA and the
recommendations of the DOD MRS study have guaranteed a large
amount of conversion and overhaul work during the next ten
years.
6. What recommendations can be developed to help both
Government and industry in retaining vital
shipbuilding capabilities?
The U.S. needs to develop a cohesive national
industrial support policy addressing the current and future
shipyard reguirements. No plan exists and there is no
provision to ensure the U.S. has a domestic source for
military vessel construction.
MarAd, in their annual survey (much of which is
classified and will not be released) , has determined that the
industrial base, as of 1991, is adeguate to support the
current and future reguirements of the nation. As the amount
of Navy construction backlog is reduced, many more shipyards
will leave the industrial base and transition to other work.
Establishing a national industrial policy could clarify
guidance to DOD and industry representatives for future
reguirements and investment strategies.
Stronger legislation should be enacted to eliminate
world subsidy practices to give the U.S. shipbuilders a "level
playing field" on which to operate. The OECD has been
negotiating an agreement on subsidies. As of 1992, they have
been unsuccessful. If the OECD were successful in achieving
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an international agreement, the U.S. shipbuilders would be
more willing to repeal the Jones Act and other U.S. support
programs
.
The Government should establish a program designed to
stimulate the entry of U.S. shipbuilding into the
international commercial market and to enhance their
competitiveness if needed.
With the current deficit problem, there is a slim
chance the Government will create subsidies or major financial
incentives for the shipbuilding industry. With global
requirements for double hull tankers and the need for
sophisticated chemical carriers and liquid natural gas ships,
the U.S. may be able to field support by marketing the
shipbuilding industry. Incorporating certain construction
loan guaranties and fostering support arrangements for U.S.-
built ships could help keep the industrial base at an
acceptable strategic size.
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Review the results of the DOD Mobility Requirements
Study and evaluate the how they compare with the
lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm. The MRS
is a recently completed study by DOD that identifies
the requirements for sealift services for future
contingencies. This study will have future impact on
the amount and type of services utilized for ship
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conversion and overhaul programs.
2. Analyze the types of contracts used over the years and
determine the most advantageous method for both the
Government and industry.
3. Evaluate the shipyard job skill reguirements and
assess the skills that would be difficult to
reconstitute once lost. It is thought that certain
job skills are too hard to generate once they are
lost, such as nuclear shipbuilding. There is a need
to identify the critical skills so proper precautions
could be taken to preserve that capability.
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DESCRIPTIONS AND GENERAL ARRANGEMENT PLANS
FOR
17 MAJOR U.S. SHIPBUILDING FACILITIES
EXCERPTS FROn REFERENCE 17
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Alabama Shipyard, Inc
Alabama Shipyard, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Atlantic Marine Holding Company of Jacksonville, Florida.
Alabama Shipyard, Inc., (formerly ADDSCO's Alabama Maritime
Corporation), is a new construction facility specializing in both
marine and industrial fabrication. The shipyard is located on
tne Mobile River, across the river from Mobile, Alabama, about 30
miles from the Gulf of Mexico. Acquired by Atlantic Marine in
1989, the yard has been in existence since 1916 and has
constructed a variety of ships (both commercial and naval),
barges and drill ships.
As of October 1, 1991, work underway at Alabama Shipyard
included construction of one floating steam boiler barge and six
crane barges for the U.S. Navy.
Alabama Shipyard, Inc., is capable of constructing ships
up to a maximum size of 213 meters by 27 meters (700 ft by 90
ft). The shipyard has 12,076 square meters (130,000 sq. ft) of
manufacturing space, 7,432 square meters (80,000 sq . ft) of
covered warehouse space, two finger piers with total usable pier
space of 1,219 meters (4,000 ft), and a 250-metric ton bridge
crane. The yard utilizes a 213-meter (700 ft) transfer launching
system. Various other gantry cranes, as well as a plate shop and
a carpenter shop, are available for construction. The yard also
has access to a twin-boom luffing derrick capable of handling
1,400 metric tons, which can be used for lifting heavy offshore
structures
.
As of mid-1991, Alabama Shipyard's employment totaled 239,








Avondale Industries, Inc. - Avondale Shipyards Division
Avondale Shipyards Division is located on the west bank of
the Mississippi River approximately six kilometers (nine miles)
upriver from New Orleans, Louisiana. Avondale, previously a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Odgen Corporation, was sold in 1985 to
its employees in an Employee Stock Ownership Plan ( ESOP ) . Since
1938, Avondale has constructed a full range of Navy and
commercial ships, as well as Coast Guard cutters and offshore
drilling rigs; and it has the distinction of being the only
American shipyard to have constructed LASH vessels.
Avondale also maintains an active repair operation for
commercial and naval ships. Inland waterway and offshore oil
vessels are repaired by Avondale 's Westwego and Harvey Divisions.
Offshore platforms, jackets, and production modules are
constructed by Avondale 's main plant.
Avondale 's new construction orderbook as of October 1,
1991, consisted of one oceanographic survey ship (T-AGS 45),
eight fleet oilers (T-AO's) and four dock landing ships (LSD's).
In addition, Avondale has contracts for the jumboization of three
Navy fleet oilers of the AO-177 class.
Avondale' s main yard facility totals 101 hectares (250
acres) and contains three outfitting docks equipped with
supporting shops and over 1,829 meters (6,000 ft) of pier space.
Avondale 's upper yard shipbuilding area has two large positions
to accommodate vessels of up to 311 meters (1,020 ft) in length
by 53 meters (175 ft) beam. The major part of one ship can be
erected along with the stern section of a second ship on position'
No. 1, while a third hull is being completed on position No. 2.
Ships constructed in the upper yard move laterally in three
positions for launching by Avondale 's large floating drydock,
which can accommodate ships as large as 305 meters by 66 meters
(1,000 ft by 216 ft), with a lifting capacity of 82,296 metric
tons. Avondale 's lower yard has a side-launching construction
area that has three large positions to accommodate ships as large
as 366 meters by 38 meters (1,200 ft by 126 ft). Ships built in
the lower yard move laterally toward the river and parallel to
the river in five positions. Up to five large vessels, greater
than 213 meters (700 ft) LOA, can be constructed simultaneously
in the lower yard. A Panamax floating drydock is moored in this
area, which can accommodate ships up to 229 meters by 34 meters
(750 ft by 110 ft), and has a lifting capacity of 20,320 metric
tons .
Avondale' s nearby Westwego, Louisiana, facility is capable
of building vessels 137 meters (450 ft) long by 27 meters (90 ft)
beam. In 1988, Avondale long-term leased the ex-Todd
Shipbuilding Corporation's New Orleans yard which is now called
the Avondale Algiers Repair and Overhaul Facility and is used for
ship repair, conversion, and overhaul.






Bath Iron Works Corporation
3ath Iron Works Corporation (SIW), a wholly-owned
suosidiary of Bath Acquisition Corporation, which is a subsidiary
of 3ath Holding Corporation, is located on the Kennebec River in
Bath, Maine. The small iron foundry which was established on
this site in 1826 became Bath Iron Works, Ltd., in 1884, and the
first shipbuilding began in 1889. This yard has constructed
various type of ships including roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels,
containerships , tankers, dredges, barges, and fishing vessels.
Bath also has built 212 surface Navy combatants.
BIW was the lead shipbuilder for the Navy's guided missile,
frigate (FFG-7 class) program and was awarded contracts for the
construction of the 24 FFG-7 class frigates. In 1982, the Navy
selected BIW as its second source for the high-technology CG 47
class AEGIS cruiser program, awarding the company contracts to
build eight of these TICONDEROGA class cruisers - the last of
which is scheduled for delivery in 1992. In 1985, BIW was
selected as the lead shipbuilder for the design and construction
of the Navy's ARLEIGH BURKE class guided missile destroyer
(DDG-51) program. Nine DDG's have been ordered from BIW - the
last is scheduled for delivery in 1996.
BIW's facilities include two shipways to accommodate ships
of 213 meters (700 ft) in length with a maximum beam of 40 meters
(130 ft), or two ships per way with a beam of 16 meters (54 ft)
each; and a 220 metric ton level-luffing crane with sufficient
outreach to erect units on both shipways. The pre-outfit
building, opened in 1987, is 61 meters by 125 meters (200 ft by
410 ft) and has 18 work stations for 219 metric ton erection
units. BIW also added a new 220 metric ton capacity revolver
crane to serve the third shipway. The shipway can accommodate a
ship 198 meters (650 ft) in length with a beam of 27 meters (88
ft). Two wharves and a pier provide a total of 655 meters (2,150
ft).
BIW operates two support facilities in East Brunswick,
located 4.8 kilometers (3 miles) from the main plant. The 13
hectare (33 acre) Hardings fabrication plant is where the initial
steel fabrication takes place. The 24 hectare (60 acre) East
Brunswick facility is the location of the 113,000 cubic meter
consolidated warehouse which uses state of the art equipment to
accomplish the transfer, handling, and storage of shipbuilding
inventory. A new 11,148 square meter (120,000 sq. ft.) pipe and
sheet metal fabrication facility was added in 1989.
BIW operates the Portland Overhaul and Repair Facility in
Portland, Maine. This facility has a large floating drydock with
a lifting capacity of 65,000 metric tons, which can accommodate a
vessel up to 257 meters by 41 meters (844 ft by 136 ft). This
facility also supports new construction programs as the site
where sonar dome installations and Post Shakedown Availabilities
(PSA's) are performed. A 9,500 metric ton lift drydock has
recently been used to overhaul four WHEC class Coast Guard ships.
As of mid-1991, the company employed a total of 10,805,





















BethShip Sparrows Point Yard
The BethShip Sparrows Point Yard is located on the
Patapsco River in the port of Baltimore, Maryland. Established
in 1891, the yard became a part of the Bethlehem organization in
1916 and served as a major shipbuilder during two world wars.
During World War II, Sparrows Point constructed 101 vessels of 16
different classes. During the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's, the
yard was among the most active in the nation, specializing in
series construction of standard size tankers up to VLCCs,
freighters, and containerships
.
Since the beginning of 1981, the yard has constructed six
Integrated Tug Barge (ITB) tankers, six offshore drilling rigs,
two container feeder barges, and two oceanographic survey ships
for the U.S. Navy. During this same period, the yard has adapted
to changing markets by increased efforts in ship conversion and
repair and industrial fabrication. In addition to numerous
drydockings and repairs on commercial and Naval ships, three
RO/ROs have been converted to Maritime Prepositioning Ships, five
RO/ROs have been ref lagged, and tunnel sections for a new
Interstate 664 Hampton Roads Tunnel Complex have been completed.
The yard is currently working on tunnel sections for the new
Interstate 90 project in Boston.
The major component of this shipyard is the building basin
(the second largest in the U.S.) for construction or repair of
ships as large as 365 meters by 59 meters (1,196 ft by 194 ft) up
to about 300,000 dwt . A two-position intermediate gate has been
installed to increase the flexibility of the basin by dividing it
into two sections. In one position the basin's sections are 274
meters and 91 meters (900 ft and 300 ft) in length. In the
second position, the sections are 209 meters and 157 meters (685
ft and 515 ft) in length.
Complementing the large construction basin, which is
served by four 181-metric ton revolving cranes, the shipyard
maintains two building ways. Each way can accommodate a maximum
ship size of 244 meters by 32 meters (800 ft by 106 ft). Four
outfitting berths are available with a combined length of 1,210
meters (3,969 ft). The berths are served by five revolving
cranes with lifting capacities up to 45 metric tons. Several
mobile cranes of various capacities are also available.
BethShip Sparrows Point Yard also has a floating drydock
capable of lifting 44,735 metric tons. The drydock can
accommodate vessels up to 274 meters (900 ft) in length with a
beam of up to 41 meters (136 ft) and a draft up to 9 meters (30
ft). The entry channel to the yard has a depth of 9 meters (30
ft).
The total labor force at the BethShip Sparrows Point Yard
was 539 at mid-1991, down from 1,330 a year earlier.
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5 . Fraser Shipyards , Incorporated
The Fraser Yard, the only major American shipyard and
drydock operation on the western end of the Great Lakes, is
located on Howards Bay in Superior, Wisconsin. Since it was
founded in the 1890 's by Capt. Alexander McDougall, who built 42
of his famous "whaleback" steamers and barges there, this plant
has had a succession of owners. From 1900 to 1926, Superior
Shipbuilding Company operated the yard and built more than 50
large Great Lakes ore carriers. The yard became a repair
facility of the American Ship Building Company from 1926 to 1945
and then became known as Knudsen Brothers Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Company. Fraser-Nelson Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company
took over the plant in 1955, and the present name was adopted in
1964. In August 1977, the yard was sold to Reuben Johnson & Son,
Incorporated, a Superior, Wisconsin, contracting and construction
firm, but business continues under the Fraser name.
Since World War II, Fraser Shipyards, a complete
shipbuilding and ship repair facility, has specialized in vessel
repair and ship modernization. In the past 20 years, Fraser has
performed most of the major ship lengthening work on the Great
Lakes. At this shipyard, general ship repair also has been an
important source of revenue.
In the early 1980' s, the Fraser yard instituted a major
renovation of its fabrication capabilities, including a 40
percent increase in its platen table capacity and extension of
its railroad trackage to increase steel unloading capabilities by
300 percent. An all-new steel cutting process with hydraulic
loading and unloading tables was installed, as well as major
repowering of the shipyard to support the expanding facilities
and to improve existing capacity. New automated welding
equipment and related modern techniques also were introduced to
increase productivity. In 1990 Fraser installed a new brake, as
well as a new shear.
Fraser maintains two graving docks suitable for ship
construction, repair, and conversion work. One basin can
accommodate a vessel 251 meters by 25 meters (825 ft by 82 ft),
and the other a vessel 189 meters by 19 meters (620 ft by 61 ft).
A small graving-type dock was added in 1973 to build new midbody
sections for the lengthening of bulk-ore freighters under
contract at that time. Pierside berthing totals 1,356 meters
(4,450 ft)
.
Fraser 's 10 mobile cranes, ranging from 14 to 136 metric
tons can service all building docks, as well as outfitting and
repair berths, and also can be floated on a crane lighter for
work afloat. The company also operates an "outside" repair fleet
totaling 12 units -- tugs, work launches, and barges -- cap Die
of performing repairs on vessels while they are loading or
unloading cargoes in Duluth-Superior harbor and adjacent ports. J
In mid-1991, employment was about 160 people.
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Halter Marine, Inc., Moss Point Division.
The Halter Moss Point
(
HMP ) facility is located on the
Escatawpa River in Moss Point, Mississippi, a short distance from
the Gulf of Mexico and Interstate 10. Significant features of the
HMP yard include: a protected, deep-waterway location; large
module fabrication and assembly platens; two launchways ; lift
capacity of up to 272 metric tons; full range of outfitting
services; and full-service warehousing facilities.
HMP recently delivered the AGOR 23 Oceanographic Research
Ship and is constructing two T-AGS 51 Class Hydrographic Survey
Ships, two T-AGS 60 Class Oceanographic Survey Ships, a 73 meter
(241 ft) Tow Boat/Inspection Vessel and a 91 meter (300 ft)
Dustpan Dredge, both for the Army Corps of Engineers.
The Halter Moss Point facility is equipped and staffed to
handle fabrication, assembly and delivery of high complexity
ships up to 130 meter (425 ft) in length. The 130 meter (425 ft)
by 62 meter (205 ft) building/launch ways are certified to MIL
STD 1625 (SH) requirements. The shipyard maintains moveable
heavy-lift crane capacity of up to 272 metric tons.
The 4-story main fabrication shop contains 929 square meters
(10,000 sq ft) and is fitted with a 5 metric ton overhead crane
serving its entire length plus an extension at each end, and a 9
metric ton Gantry crane. The pipe shop covers 855 square meters
(9,200 sq ft). The building is serviced by four 1-ton jibs and a
5 metric ton overhead crane and contains standard outfit of pipe
fabrication tools and equipment, including six pipefitter work
stations. The combined carpenter shop and electric shop contains
465 square meters (5,000 sq ft). The carpenter shop contains a
joiner, band saw, radial arm saw and complete outfit of portable
tools and equipment. The electric shop contains portable test
equipment, meters and instruments for continuity and polarity
checks, insulation resistance testing, cable installation tools
and equipment and battery service facilities.
The main warehouse contains 1,858 square meters (20,000 sq
ft) of modern receiving and weatherproof storage space.
Environmentally controlled warehouse space for the stowage and
test of sensitive equipment is available on site.
The HMP yard has a steel fabrication throughput capacity of
400 tons per month. The pipe shop has the capacity to provide up
to 22,859 meters (75,000 linear ft) of pipe per year. The Paint
Shop has the capacity to blast and paint over 363 metric tons of
steel per month.














. Inqalls Shipbuilding, Inc.
The Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., a division of Litton
Industries, Inc., is located on the Gulf of Mexico in Pascagoula,
Mississippi. Ingalls is a diversified shipbuilding facility
experienced in the construction, modernization, conversion, and
overhaul of Navy warships and auxiliaries. Since 1975, Ingalls
has designed, built and delivered to the Navy 55 major surface
combatant ships
.
As of October 1, 1991, the company held orders for five
Aegis cruisers -- the last of which is scheduled for delivery in
1994. Other ships under contract were three Ingalls-designed
multi-purpose amphibious assault ships ( LHDs ) for the Navy, as
well as eight new DDG-51 class guided missile destroyers. In
addition, Ingalls has a regular workload of Navy overhauls and
repairs. The Ingalls backlog also includes three SA'AR corvettes
for the Government of Israel.
Ingalls 243 hectare (600 acre) West Bank facility,
completed in 1970, does not have conventional inclined
shipbuilding ways but is geared to assembly-line construction.
Fabricated steel and subassemblies are brought from the various
shops to the subassembly area where they are erected and pre-
outfitted, then moved to the module assembly area. These areas
are divided into five bays, each of which can produce 5,447
metric ton modules. After assembly and outfitting, the modules
are moved to the integration area where they are erected into a
complete ship. The ship is then moved to a floating drydock
(resting on a submerged grid) which is subsequently floated and
moved to a deep-water area where it is ballasted and the ship
launched. The drydock can launch or recover a maximum ship size
of 259 meters by 53 meters (850 ft by 173 ft). Approximately
1,432 meters (4,700 ft) of berthing space, serviced by cranes up
to 272 metric tons, are available for outfitting. In August
1988, about 16,721 square meters (180,000 sq . ft) of the
shipyard's slab area were brought under roof to increase the
amount of early outfitting performed. Improved pipe production
facilities, a machinery packaging facility, and a new blast and
paint station in the steel fabrication complex have been added.
Ingalls 's older East Bank facility has been in operation
since 19 38, engaged primarily in the construction of commercial
cargo ships and tankers. Although there are six inclined
shipways and a graving dock at East Bank, they were all taken out
of service in 1989. Refurbishment of these facilities is
anticipated to take at least two years. However, a wharf and
four piers provide a total of 914 meters (3,000 ft) of berthing
space serviced by cranes with up to 54 metric tons of capacity
for outfitting and topside repair.
Ingalls Shipbuilding Division of Litton Industries at





3 . Marinette Marine Corporation
Marinette Marine Corporation is a privately-owned Great
Lakes shipbuilding company founded during the early months of
World War II and located in northeast Wisconsin. During the past
49 years, the yard has built nearly 1,300 vessels, including
harbor tugs, research vessels, torpedo weapon retrievers,
minehunters and yard patrol craft.
As of October 1, 1991, Marinette Marine was engaged in the
construction of an Aids-to-Navigation ( ATON ) Barge for the U.S.
Coast Guard. In addition, Marinette Marine held a contract for
participating in the design competition for the Coast Guard's
Ocean-Going Buoy Tenders ( WLB ) . Earlier in 1991, Marinette Marine
delivered two mine countermeasure vessels (MCMs) to the Navy and
an additional ATON Barge to the U.S. Coast Guard.
The shipyard covers 23 hectares (57 acres) and has over
134,146 square meters (1.44 million sq . ft) of enclosed workspace
permitting year-round, uninterrupted construction of vessels up
to 122 meters (400 ft) in length overall with a beam of up to 20
meters (65 ft). Large fabrication shops and erection areas, a
200 metric ton shiplift, three launchways , and numerous berthing
spaces along the 671 meter (2,200 ft) dockwall provide the
facilities needed to construct multiple ships in assembly line
fashion
.
Marinette Marine's module construction method is
complemented by separate cutting, fabricating, assembly, and
trade shops allowing smooth and efficient movement of material
and prefabricated components through the construction process
.
Many of the shops are equipped with overhead bridge cranes of up
to 45 metric ton capacity; and multiple crawler cranes service
the outdoor erection areas. Large modules and completed vessels
are transferred and erected using a Dual Walking Beam ship
transfer system.
Total employment at the yard in mid-1991 was 218, compared
to 300 a year earlier.
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9 . Merce Industries, Inc.
In January 1985, the Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority
purchased this shipyard from The American Ship Building Company
which owned the yard since 1947 and closed it in 1982. In
September 1985, the yard was re-opened when Merce Industries,
Inc., a 25-year old topside repair firm, entered into an
agreement with the Port Authority to operate the shipyard for 25
years. Merce Industries, Inc. (Toledo Shipyard), is a complete,
full-service shipyard, equipped for new construction, conversion
and repair, including propeller repair.
Since Merce Industries, Inc., began operating the yard,
they have made extensive repairs and have upgraded and renovated
the facility, including the leveling of the old fit-out building
adjacent to one of the drydocks , which improved access to the
pier area between the graving docks and the wet slip area. Merce
Industries elected not to lease the buildings immediately
adjacent to the yard as the firm had existing facilities that
were superior and in the nearby area. These existing facilities
include a 4,645 square meter fabricating/propeller repair
facility and a 1115 square meter machining and pressure vessel
shop
.
Complete facilities for propeller repair services in all
alloys is available through the American Propeller Division.
The company maintains two graving docks . One can
accommodate vessels up to 207 meters by 24 meters (680 ft by 78
ft), and the other, vessels as large as 165 meters by 21 meters
(540 ft by 68 ft). Usable berthing space totals about 488 meters
(1,600 ft)
.
On December 17, 1986, Toledo Shipyard filed for protection
under Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code. In June 1988, the
court approved a reorganization plan allowing a five-year
repayment period.
As of mid-1991, employment at the shipyard totaled 60.
Employment increases during the winter months as repair activity
on the Great Lakes increases.
The Manitowoc Company, Inc., as of December 30, 1991, had
acquired the assets of Merce Industries, Inc. In the future
Merce Industries, same as Bay Shipbuilding, another component of
Manitowoc, will not be involved in new construction, but will
concentrate on repair and conversions in the marine industry.
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National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO), the
largest shipbuilder on the West Coast, participates in both the
commercial and the U.S. Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and repair
markets. In the marine business since 1945, the company now
occupies 59 hectares (145 acres) on the harbor in San Diego,
California. In 1989, NASSCO became an employee-owned company.
In the past, NASSCO has constructed OBO carriers, very
large crude carriers (VLCC) up to 209,000 dwx
,
product carriers,
destroyer tenders, a large cable repair ship, special purpose
ships and a variety of Navy vessels. NASSCO conversion projects
have included the conversion of two 90,000 dwt tankers to
1,000-bed hospital ships (T-AH), three containerships to Maritime
Prepositioning Ships (T-AKX), and the reconstruction of three
former Sea-Land SL-7 containerships to Fast Sealift Ships (T-AKR)
for the Navy. Repair and overhaul work during the past few years
;
consisted principally of Navy contracts.
NASSCO has contracts to design and construct three AOE
class Fast Combat Support Ships for the Navy. In January 1990,
NASSCO was awarded a commercial contract to build a containership
for the Matson Navigation Company. NASSCO recently completed
major repairs of the VLCC, the EXXON VALDEZ. As of October 1,
1991, NASSCO was performing overhaul and repair work on three
Navy vessels
.
NASSCO' s facilities include a building dock in which ships
up to 299 meters by 52 meters (980 ft by 170 ft) can be
constructed. In addition, the company operates three inclined
building ways. Two of these can accommodate a maximum size ship
of 274 meters by 34 meters (900 ft by 110 ft) and one a ship size
of 210 meters by 27 meters (690 ft by 90 ft). Cranes are
available that can provide lifts up to 159 metric tons. Berthing
is available at 10 full-service berths that can accommodate ships
with drafts up to 11 meters (35 ft) and lengths up to 305 meters
(1,000 ft). NASSCO also operates a 25,400 metric ton floating
drydock
.
NASSCO has a full-service machine shop, carpenter shop,
sheet metal shop and pipe shop with an automated pipe silo. The
company's steel fabrication and assembly facilities, with a
capacity of 1,816 metric tons per week, includes seven burning
machines: one has a plasma arc and two have computer numerical
control. Steel assembly facilities include a modern 16 meters
(52 ft) panel line, eight assembly tables with a combined area of
11,472 square meters (123,500 sq. ft), a turning jig for curved
steel blocks, and an enhanced pin jig area with two bridge
cranes . There is also an automated line for blasting and priming
steel plates and shapes. NASSCO offers full-service marine
engineering and naval architecture, utilizing the latest
technology such as Computer-Graphics Augmented Drafting and
Manufacturing System (CADAM).
As of mid-1991 the total labor force was 3,931, down
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1 1 . Newport News Shipbuilding
Newport News Shipbuilding, located at the Port of Hampton
Roads in Newport News, Virginia, is the largest shipbuilding
complex in the United States. The company, founded in 1886, is a
subsidiary of Tenneco, Inc. Newport News has built 25 aircraft
carriers, 4 2 nuclear-powered submarines, and over 120 other
surface ships for the U.S. Navy. Commercial vessels delivered by
the yard include 71 cargo ships, 85 tankers, 61 passenger ships
(most notably the famed superliner UNITED STATES), and more than
50 other self-propelled vessels. Newport News was a pioneer in
the field of jumboizing ships, and since 1957 has completed 34
such operations. The last commercial vessel built in the yard
was delivered in September 1983.
Newport News is the Nation's foremost builder of Navy
nuclear warships. As of October 1, 1991, the yard was at work on
three Nimitz class aircraft carriers and 9 attack submarines.
Overhaul and repair of nuclear-powered submarines and surface
ships for the Navy are also a principal activity at Newport News.
Included in Newport News major facilities are:
Docks and Shipways - There are eight separate docking facilities.!
Shipway 12, the largest building basin in the nation, is 492
meters (1,613 ft) long, 76 meters (250 ft) wide, and 10 meters
(33 ft) deep. Three positions for the intermediate gate expand
the multi-ship construction capability of this dock, permitting
simultaneous ship construction and repair. A 900 metric ton
gantry crane, one of the largest in the world, can handle
completely outfitted assemblies. This crane has a height of 71
meters (234 ft) overall, a girder clearance of 61 meters (200 ft)
and a span between rail centers of 165 meters (540 ft). Shipways
10 and 11 are used for construction work, as well as overhaul and
repair, and are serviced by a 315 metric ton gantry crane. The
other four graving docks (Dry Docks 1-4) are used mainly for ship
repair and overhaul work. The floating drydock, which is 195
meters by 43 meters (640 ft by 140 ft), is primarily used as a
part of the submarine land level facility.
Vessel Berthing - Newport News has two outfitting berths totaling
799 meters (2,620 ft) each serviced by 30 metric ton cranes.
There are six piers totaling 3,353 meters (11,000 ft) serviced by
cranes with capacities of up to 45 metric tons in addition to the
two small piers included with the submarine land level facility.
Submarine Construction and Repair Complex - This land level
facility is currently being used for construction of nuclear
attack submarines. It includes a modular outfitting facility
(MOF), outboard ways, two small piers, a transporter and transfer
system, and a floating drydock.
The labor force at Newport News in mid-1991 was about














































Peterson Builders, Inc. (PBI), of Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin,
established in 1933, is a privately owned, full service,
construction and repair shipyard, which serves the government,
commercial and service industries. The shipyard offers
construction capabilities in wood, steel, fiberglass and
aluminum, as well as design and production expertise. Their
continuing backlog of ship construction, complemented by
conversion, repair, and special projects of unigue assembly
fabrications, enables PBI to maintain a skilled labor force and
to keep pace with the latest technologies and developments in the
industry
.
The main yard, with about 3 hectares (7 acres) of
buildings, provides inside construction and production
facilities; total area is about 5 hectares (13 acres). Extensive 1
waterfront facilities provide berthing for vessels up to 274
meters (900 ft) in length. PBI operates two side launching
shipways ; one can accommodate a maximum ship length of 152 meters
(500 ft) and the other 69 meters (225 ft). Also, inside ship
construction capabilities for vessels up to 70 meters by 18
meters (230 ft by 60 ft) are available. PBI ' s floating drydock
has the capacity to accommodate a vessel up to 110 meters by 12
meters (360 ft by 40 ft) and is Navy-certified for 1,118 metric
tons .
Current construction contracts underway at PBI are for six
wooden 68-meter (224 ft) Mine Countermeasure Ships (MCMs) for the
U.S. Navy. As part of the Navy's mine warfare renewal program,
these MCMs will replace ships in service since the early 1950's.
PBI has been a leader in mine craft construction since that time;
longer than any other shipyard in the world. This new generation
of wooden ships being built at PBI are not the only "first of a
kind" contracts awarded to the yard. Other "new class of ship"
construction contracts completed for the U.S. Navy are four steel
69-meter (255 ft) ARS Auxiliary Rescue/Salvage ships and seven
wooden 33-meter (108 ft) YP Yard Patrol craft. PBI also
maintains a long-standing history for commercial vessel
construction ranging from super tuna seiners, research ships,
large passenger/car ferries, and a range of tugs.
During 1991, Peterson Builders received contracts for the
overhaul and repair of a 23-meter (77 ft) Fire Boat for the city
of Detroit, a 15-meter (50 ft) EPA boat, and modifications to a
23-meter (75 ft) excursion boat. Two 55-meter (180 ft) U.S.
Coast Guard Buoy Tenders were drydocked and sea chests coated.
At mid-1991, the company's average total employment was





















































13 . Portland Ship Repair Yard
The Portland Ship Repair Yard is part of the Municipal
Corporation of the Port of Portland. The 57-hectare (140 acre)
shipbuilding and ship repair facility is located in Portland,
Oregon, on the Willamette River. The yard was developed from the
World War II Swan Island Shipbuilding facilities which delivered
1,076 oceangoing ships.
During 1990, projects undertaken by contracted users of
the yard included the reduction in deadweight capacity of an oil
tanker from 165,000 tons to 125,000 tons by removing a 17-meter
(55 ft) section of the ship and construction and load-out of $75
million worth of gas handling modules for the North Slope oil
fields
.
The shipbuilding assets are augmented by the individual
facility users' assets. Cascade General, Inc., Northwest Marine
Inc., and West State, Inc., are contracted users of the facility.
The shipbuilding facilities at the Portland Ship Repair
Yard are capable of producing modular-type units from 1,525 to
5,084 metric tons. Units are transported by rubber-tired
vehicles, crawler or walker, via a launching bridge to two
locations. At one ship construction location, a vessel 145
meters by 30 meters (475 ft by 100 ft) can be constructed using
the No. 3 drydock for launching. At the other location, a vessel
up to 247 meters by 33 meters (810 ft by 108 ft) can be
constructed using the No. 3 and No. 4 drydocks for launching.
Portland Ship Repair Yard operates three drydocks. The
largest two (No. 3 and No. 4) can accommodate vessels up to 247
meters by 33 meters (810 ft by 108 ft), and 351 meters by 55
meters (1,150 ft by 181 ft), respectively. A total of 3,078
meters (10,100 ft) of fully serviced pier space with 16 whirley
type cranes are employed for outfitting. In 1986, a new layberth
facility (Berth 315) was added which can accommodate two 335-
meter (1,100-foot) VLCCs in lay-up status.
The yard has 46,447 square meters (500,000 sq . ft) of
fully-enclosed service shops and warehouse space. The 11 module
assembly bays are 98 meters (323 ft) long, 21 meters (70 ft) wide
(clear), and 18 meters (60 ft) high (clear).
The Portland Ship Repair Yard is preparing to expand its
modular construction capability by an additional 14 hectares (34
acres), located in the Swan Island Basin. This facility will be
suitable for constructing ship modules.



















14 . Tacoma Boatbuilding Company
In operation since 1926 in Tacoma, Washington, this
shipyard has designed, constructed, and repaired vessels for
commercial customers, the Navy and Coast Guard, and foreign
governments. Tacoma Boat's overall facilities consist .of two
yards covering over 12 hectares (30 acres) of company-owned or
leased property located adjacent to the Commencement Bay
industrial complex.
Tacoma Boat has grown continuously through the years,
producing a diversified construction pattern including a variety
of standard-class tuna purseiners, a semi-submersible offshore
oil-drilling rig, barges and tug/supply vessels for the offshore
oil industry, WYTM icebreaking tugs and WMEC cutters 82-meter
(270 ft) long for the Coast Guard, revolutionary-design tractor
tugs, and high-speed patrol ships, gunboats, and minesweepers for
the Navy and/or foreign governments. The company also helped
design and build an 80-knot surface effect ship (SES).
During the 1984 to mid-1991 period, Tacoma delivered 12
ocean surveillance ships (T-AGOS) to the U.S. Navy. This T-AGOS
contract was a focal point for zone outfitting in which various
portions or "zones" of a ship were built separately as virtually
complete units and then assembled at the launchway.
The Company is working under a contract with the Republic
of China to supply engineering design and technical assistance,
as well as material, equipment and machinery for two 82-meter
(270 ft) Customs Preventative ships being constructed in Taiwan.
The Company is also working under a contract with the Government
of Egypt for the modernization of four Romeo-C Class submarines.
This project includes the upgrading of the navigation,
communications, electronic sensors and weapon systems and will be
accomplished by the Company at the Egyptian Naval facilities in
Alexandria, Egypt.
Tacoma Boat's facilities include four end-launch
construction ways, the largest of which can construct vessels up
to 131 meters by 15 meters (430 ft by 50 ft). Available for
outfitting and repair work are 411 meters (1,350 ft) of berthing
space
.
The total work force at Tacoma Boat at mid-1991 was 88,
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15 . Tampa Shipyards, Incorporated
Founded in 1948, Tampa Shipyards, Inc., (formerly Tampa
Ship Repair and Drydock Co.) is a full-service yard which was
purchased by The American Ship Building Company in 1972 and is
located on the recently deepened 13-meter (43 ft) Sparkman
Channel in Tampa, Florida.
During World War II, the company built Navy auxiliary
vessels and C2 cargo ships for the Maritime Commission. Since
World War II, Tampa Ship has been a major Gulf Coast repair yard.
During the 1980 's significant projects completed by Tampa Ship
included the conversion of four Moore-McCormack C4 cargo ships to
larger self-sustaining breakbulk/container vessels and the
construction of five 30,000 dwt clean-product, ice-strengthened
tankers for charter to the Military Sealift Command.
During 1989, Tampa Shipyards completed the conversion of
two freighters to auxiliary crane ships, T-ACS 7 and 8, for the
U.S. Navy. Work is currently underway on the completion of two
T-AO fleet oilers, BENJAMIN ISHERWOOD and HENRY ECKFORD, which
were originally contracted to Pennsylvania Shipbuilding Company
in 1985.
Major facility installations were integrated into Tampa's
ship construction program in 1984. The additions include: a
concrete pier, two graving docks, two wet berths, additional
shops, and an erection/assembly building. The erection/assembly
building is 183 meters by 44 meters by 35 meters (600 ft by 145
ft by 115 ft), and is serviced by three overhead bridge cranes
with a combined lifting capacity of 800 metric tons. About 107
meters (350 ft) of this building straddles one of the graving
docks, allowing pre-assembled units weighing in excess of 608
metric tons to be erected in a totally enclosed environment. The
company currently has four graving docks operational. The
largest can handle ships up to 273 meters by 45 meters (896 ft by
146 ft). Two of the drydocks can accommodate a vessel as large
as 226 meters by 32 meters (742 ft by 106 ft).
To provide additional fabricating capability, Tampa Ship
has purchased the Westinghouse heavy steel fabricating facility
on Tampa's Westshore Blvd. This facility provides over 4
hectares (11 acres) of covered fabrication floor, bridge cranes
up to 635-metric ton capacity, and barge loading facilities. The
building is two hours by tow from Tampa Ship. This heavy steel
fabricating facility is now referred to as the Westshore
Facility. In addition, Tampa Ship currently leases two wet
berths north of the main yard at South Slip. These wet berths
are 256 meters (840 ft) and 213 meters (700 ft) long.
As of mid-1991, 1,142 people were on the Tampa payroll
compared to 830 in mid-1990.
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16 . Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation - Seattle Division
Todd's Seattle Division is located at the northwest corner
of Harbor Island in Elliot Bay, less than 10 minutes from
downtown Seattle, Washington. From 1898 until 1916, when the
William H. Todd Company of New York bought the shipyard from the
Seattle Construction and Drydock Company, a variety of vessels
were produced, including the world's finest six-masted barkentine
and (at that time) the world's fastest single-screw steamer.
This 21-hectares (52 acre) yard has been a prime supplier of
fighting ships for the Navy. During World War II, Todd-Seattle
constructed over 125 ships and repaired and serviced some 2,700
deep draft vessels of all sizes, types, and flags. Since 1952,
the yard has built 80 vessels of 20 different types.
As of October 1, 1991, work in the yard included the
modernization of eight Hamilton class Coast Guard cutters with
the last scheduled for redelivery in April 1992. This yard has
an active ship repair and overhaul operation that annually works
on a large number of commercial and naval vessels.
The largest building way at Todd-Seattle can handle a ship
up to 183 meters by 29 meters (600 ft by 96 ft). It can also be
used as a dual launchway for simultaneous construction of two
ships with beams of 15 meters (50 ft) or less. A small side-
launch building way is also available. In addition to the 40,640
metric ton (40,000 long ton) drydock, there are two other
floating drydocks, the larger of which can accommodate ships up
to 287 meters by 41 meters (943 ft by 133 ft).
In July 1982, the company transferred a 40,640 metric ton
(40,000 long ton) floating drydock from its San Francisco
Division to Seattle. A new 137 metric ton traveling whirley
crane on the adjacent 305-meter (1,000 ft) concrete pier serves
the floating drydock and the adjacent berths. A second pier was
rebuilt in concrete and lengthened to give the yard a 427 meter
(1,400 ft) berth with a 12 meter (40 ft) water depth.
Two wharves and five piers provide a total of 1,834 meters
(6,017 ft) of berthing space for outfitting and repair. The yard
is serviced by 15 whirley traveling cranes, with lifting
capacities ranging from 23 metric tons to 136 metric tons.
In mid-1991, total employment at the Seattle plant was
1,278, down from 2,552 at mid-1990.
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Exhibit 16
1 Dry Dock #1
2. Dry Dock #2
3. Dry Dock #3 (Emerald Sea)
4. End Launch Ways
5. Side Launch Ways
6. Mam Steel Fabrication Shop
7. Burning and Fabrication Shop
8 Machine Shop
9. Shot Blast and Paint Facility
10. Warehouse
11. Administration Building
12. Repair Superintendent's Office
13. Engineering
14 Pipe Shop
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Trinity Industries, Inc. - Beaumont Yard
This shipyard, located on the Neches River in Beaumont,
Texas, was established in 1917 by Beaumont Shipbuilding and
Drydock Company, which built Cl-A cargo ships and Navy
minesweepers during World War II. In 1947, the yard was acquired
by Bethlehem Steel Corporation, which pioneered the design and
production of mobile offshore drilling rigs, drill ships,
offshore oil and gas facilities and barges. After closure in
mid-1988, the yard was acquired and reopened in mid-1989 by
Trinity Industries, Inc., of Dallas, Texas.
Trinity's Beaumont yard is highly mechanized. In the
early 1970s, a multimillion-dollar panel line and material
handling facilities were installed. In recent years, capital
improvements included installation of a CNC plasma burning
machine, larger plate bending rolls, larger overhead bridge
cranes, pipe burning and bending equipment, a pipe fabrication
shop, improved welding equipment, mobile cranes, and improved
building platens.
Trinity-Beaumont has one side-launching way that can
accommodate ships up to approximately 267 meters by 32 meters
(875 ft by 105 ft). Also, the yard has recently acquired under
lease a floating drydock (AFDM-2) from the Navy. This drydock,
which can accommodate a vessel up to 198 meters (650 ft) in
length with a beam of 29 meters (95 ft), is expected to be in
operation by December 1991.
There are 1,402 meters (4,600 ft) of fully-serviced piers
and wharves and mobile equipment for servicing ships or other
vessels at pierside or anchorage. With a 508 metric ton (500
ton) lift capacity, the company's barge-mounted "Big Bessie" is
the largest floating derrick between Houston and New Orleans.
Employment at Trinity's Beaumont facility at mid-1991 was
95 personnel. While awaiting a major marine construction
contract, Trinity is utilizing the yard's flexibility by
repairing and servicing railcars, building LPG tank barges and
both inland and ocean hopper barges.
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